

INDIA
A Bird's-Eye View

by

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I. HISTORIC INDIA

THERE is no country in the world which presents a picture of greater variety than India. Nor is there any part of Asia which offers a sharper contrast with the West. India, indeed, stands apart from all other lands. Representative only of itself, this great peninsula is an altogether different world, to which Europe finds no easy access and in which there is much that other Asiatics neither value nor understand. Indeed, one suspects that many of the generalizations about East and West are really drawn from Indian evidence, and are not so apt for other parts of Asia. India is apart from the rest of the world, including most of Asia, with a peculiar kind of difference more profound than any that separates China from England or Japan from Ancient Greece. When the Western man, be he European or American, approaches the Hindu world, he finds himself in another element; and, as the swimmer must unclot himself before he can move in water, so the European must abandon the whole Western vesture of his mind before he can truly appreciate India. Standards of value are here reversed, the facts of life become *Maya*, or illusion, and the figure of man, so vital, so self-reliant in Europe, fades to a shadow before the invisible powers.

The physical setting of life in India is as full of variety and contrast as the life itself. From Cape Comorin in the south to the highest Himalayas in the north there are diversities of race, colour, climate, and language in profusion. In magnitude India is larger than the whole of Europe outside Russia, being nineteen times the size of the United Kingdom; while in habit, speech, and custom Madras in the south is farther removed from Peshawar in the north-west than Barcelona is from Stockholm, and much farther than Buenos Aires is from Vancouver. It is, in fact, a sub-continent geographically divided into three regions; in the extreme north the massive Himalayan mountains and subsidiary ranges; in the central north, the great plain and river systems of the Indus and Ganges; and in the south, the plateau of the Deccan and Central India which confronts the sea on the west in a steep hilly barrier known as the Western Ghats, but slopes more gradually to the east.

The variations of climate in India depend chiefly on three factors—latitude, distance from the sea, and the south-west monsoon. Although northern India is in the same latitude as the Mediterranean and southern California, the greater part of it is so far from the sea that there are great extremes of temperature between night and day, and between summer and winter. Southern India, on the other hand, although in the tropics,

has less variety of temperature owing to the temperate influence of the seas that nearly enclose it. But the most significant factor of all in the climate of India is the south-west monsoon, the midsummer wind which brings a punctual, but sometimes inadequate, rainfall to the whole country. So dependent is India on this annual rainfall that variations from year to year mean prosperity or disaster for millions. The rainfall varies from something less than 3.6 inches per annum in the Upper Sind (where, indeed, there is often none at all, and "men drink but once a day, and cattle every second day, and neither ever washes!"), to 400 inches at Cherrapunji in Assam. To defeat the caprice of the monsoon and to insure against shortage of water, irrigation and the storage of water have been the chief instruments. The past generation has seen the completion of many great irrigation projects of this kind, which, combined with greatly improved communications by rail, road, and river, have almost driven the dread spectre of famine out of India. The nature of the problem of protecting the people from shortage and from famine will best be understood by examining the character and distribution of the population, of which it may be said that the capacity to protect themselves from disaster has always been in inverse ratio to the density of the population in rural areas.

No country in the world except China has a larger population than India. The census of 1941—of which only provisional returns have so far been published—is likely to show that the total figure is not far short of 400 millions; approximately one-sixth of the total population of the world. India is only a little more than half the size of the United States, but its population is three times the American total. Density varies greatly, from 4,000 persons to the square mile in the State of Cochin to 6.5 in Baluchistan. Two-thirds of the population live in one-quarter of the country. On the whole the greatest density of population is found where the rainfall is heaviest.

India is a land of peasants, living dangerously near the margin of subsistence. It conforms nearly to James VI's description of the Kingdom of Fife as "a beggar's mantle fringed with gold." Over vast rural areas the standard of life is low, though not so low as in some other parts of Asia, nor so low as it was before railways and irrigation works had rescued the country from devastating famines. Accurate comparison of present-day conditions with those of the past is not possible owing to lack of reliable records; but it is certain that the national income has risen considerably in recent times, and with it the average well-being. But averages are misleading because the chief contribution to the rising income in the twentieth century has been industrial development which

is unequally distributed, leaving vast rural tracts untouched. Even the great increase in the foreign demand for Indian raw products has conferred economic benefits in very unequal measure. The central economic problem of rural India, and therefore of the whole country, is to raise the purchasing power of the peasant to the point where he can be assured of adequate nutrition and something more. Mr Gandhi has shown that he is aware of what this "something more" should be, in his campaign for the use of the *Charkha*—the spinning wheel. Much ignorant derision has been poured upon him for making this harmless necessary instrument one of the chief symbols of his campaign. But no one who knows Indian conditions will deny that the establishment of home-industry, village workshops, and local processing factories for peasant products is a prime need which has not been met, despite the devoted work of many District Officers, missionaries, co-operative societies, and such bodies as the Servants of India.

There are formidable obstacles in the path of this progress. Chief of them is Hinduism itself. Next come illiteracy, and poverty which stands in the way of its own removal. The indebtedness of the cultivator to the money-lender means that the lowest incomes are always heavily mortgaged before they are earned. Moreover, the veneration of the cow and the low level of literacy combine to make agricultural reform, even of the simplest kind, no easy task. The former stands starkly in the way of the improvement of livestock, and the latter deprives the peasant of an important lever to raise the level of his life. Literacy varies from 9.3 per cent in Bengal to 4.2 per cent in North West Frontier Province. Here the contributing factors are custom which has made learning the prerogative of the few, and the prevailing poverty which has made universal elementary education difficult to provide.

The most striking fact about the people of India is their varied character. There are in India more differences of race, language, and religion than in the whole of western Europe from Finland to Gibraltar, an area approximately equal to India. The great majority (about 70 per cent) are Hindus; Mohammedans account for about 22 per cent, the other minorities being Christians, Sikhs, Jains, Parsees, and Jews. Within the Hindu majority are included so many different castes and sub-castes that they baffle description or enumeration in so comprehensive a bird's-eye view as is here attempted.

Even more significant than this variety is the social frame within which these diverse peoples have lived for many centuries past. In other countries the binding force which has held society together may, in one case, have been the power of a monarchy, in another, the prevailing

obedience to the rule of secular law. The cohesion of Indian society was not derived from either of these sources, but was maintained by Hinduism, in itself a unique combination of belief, custom, law, and ritual observance which governed life from the cradle to the grave. It imposed a rigid social control on all within the Hindu pale, but left the profession of faith elastic and undefined. It was always easier to say what the true Hindu must *do* or must not do than to declare what he must *believe* before he could claim to be orthodox. It was a code of ritual conduct, an all-embracing way of life, under the compelling sanction of a religion interpreted and enforced by a hereditary priestly caste, whose power over the lives of men far eclipsed the temporal authority of any political ruler, no matter how absolute.

In Hindu society there was thus little room for politics; and government was a thing imposed, accepted by all, but at the same time remote compared with the all-pervading influence of Hinduism itself. Political life is a modern growth in India. Historic India was not a political country, and the habit of political thought began to grow only under the stimulus of the West. Social and religious changes strike deeper than those in the political sphere. The problems of India arise in their most acute form where some new force strikes most sharply at some essential part of the structure of Hinduism. This is true both of the disturbance created *within* the structure by movements to emancipate the Untouchables, and by greater disturbances created from *without*, by the invading power of Islam, or by influences flowing from Europe.

Taking the internal disturbance first, we can only appreciate its significance if we realize that the whole structure of *caste* was regarded as pre-ordained, permanent, and unchangeable. Caste may have originally been an appropriate division of Indian society according to occupation: first the Holy Man, the Brahmin; next the Warrior; next the Merchant; below him the Artisan; and at the bottom of the scale the oppressed and degraded proletariat of the Untouchables who perform the menial tasks of Indian life, and have been kept in subjection throughout the ages. Their historic fate of oppression shows how foreign to the Hindu conception of society is the principle of democratic rights. Caste itself is a hierarchical order; and in course of time it grew so rigid and was so firmly fixed in the universal conviction of the people that the Untouchables themselves accepted their fate as part of the order of the universe which they could not, and would not, upset. Normally reckoned as coming within the general Hindu pale, they are now described by statute as the Scheduled Castes, but were formerly known as the Depressed Classes or Untouchables. They number no less than 51½ mil-

lion, and play a part of increasing importance in the whole public life of India. In the aspect of religion they remain part of the whole Hindu community; but, both in the columns of the Census and in their own political attitude, they take a separate place. After centuries of subjection to the higher castes, they now claim recognition as a social and political class with rights of its own, hitherto unacknowledged.

This community alone would make the Indian task of self-government difficult; for the Scheduled Castes that compose it have in the past been something more than an unenfranchised proletariat, in the political sense. They were the "nameless herd of humanity" that was placed in permanent subordination to the Upper Castes by the Laws of Manu, which laid down the authentic order of Hindu society. Profane law, enacted by a modern legislature, may remove such disabilities; but something deeper than legislative enactment is needed to confer that full enfranchisement which denotes the free citizen. Much has been done to bring about the necessary change in the Hindu mind, which is indispensable to the complete liberation of this community; and in this Gandhi himself has taken no small part. But the fact that Dr Ambedkar and the other leaders of the Untouchables still demand constitutional safeguards for their political rights shows that this battle in the campaign of Indian freedom has still to be won.

This problem vividly illustrates the central theme of Indian reform. No matter what may be declared in Constitutional or Statute Law, custom and habit, thought and feeling must express the spirit of the reforming law, otherwise it is a dead letter. Thus, those who speak of rights as being "conferred" or "granted" mistake the nature of the problem and the task to be performed. Further on in this argument we shall mark some of the influences at work to bring about the change required. Meanwhile it should be noted that outside India the position and claims of the Depressed Classes have received less attention than they deserve, mainly because the more dramatic problem of Hindu-Moslem relations has overshadowed them. The latter, indeed, challenges the architects of India's future to their greatest effort. This sun-dering cleft which separates Hinduism from the world of Islam is the chief obstacle to Indian unity. It can be seen from two aspects, one deriving its significance from the past history of the two communities, the other from the nature of the two religions.

The first is the fact that, since the period which Europe calls the Middle Ages, and until the British came, the Moslems were the most formidable of all the outside forces that were brought to bear on Indian life. For centuries there were successive Moslem invasions of India,

culminating in the establishment of the Mogul Empire and carrying the faith of Islam in successive waves throughout nearly the whole Indian peninsula. Thus there is in the memory of the Indian Moslem a tradition of successful conquest; and so far did the Moslem power penetrate that it has left behind it to this day great enclaves of the Islamic faith in such traditionally non-Islamic regions as Bengal, and even Madras. In Eastern Bengal the Moslem majority are actually the descendants of Hindus forcibly converted to Islam in days gone by. Thus the armed power of the followers of the Prophet not only won territory and thrones for the Islamic invader but also left behind it powerful heirs to the Moslem tradition long after the conquest was over and the conqueror's day had waned. This tradition was, at one and the same time, a memory of lordship and a sign of an even more abiding religious mission. And, inasmuch as both the person and the faith of the invader were alien to the deep-rooted traditions of India, it is hardly surprising that their heritage to-day should still be a cause of division.

But neither the memory of the former Moslem conquest nor any action of the British Raj would have sufficed to keep alive this feud if Islam and Hinduism had not stood in such sharp contrast to each other. It has often been said in disparagement of British rule that the British Raj has maintained itself by exploiting the division between these two great communities. Indeed, the critics of Britain have sometimes maintained that the Government of India has deliberately fostered the Hindu-Moslem feud, on the cynical rule—*Divide et Impera*. It is true that British administrators sometimes spoke in past times as if their power to govern India depended in part on preventing Hindus and Moslems from combining; but the history of British India, as a whole, offers little evidence in support of the charge that *Divide et Impera* was the guiding rule of the British Raj. It is not now, nor has it ever been, in the power of the British Government to perpetuate this religious division. If India had created for herself a sense of patriotic unity, capable of overcoming or embracing the religious differences between Hindu and Moslem, no power on earth could have kept these differences alive. They are alive because they draw their power from different springs of faith, the upholders of the two faiths viewing each other with dislike and contempt. Moreover, they continue to disturb the life of India because neither protagonist has yet fully realized that there are great objects of common concern for which both can combine their efforts, and, in combining them, provide India with the opportunity of escaping from disunity.

The difference between these two faiths is something more than a sectarian division such as has figured so strongly in the history of Europe. There is a more radical distinction between Islam and Hinduism than that which marks the Catholic and Protestant faiths; and therefore the analogies sometimes drawn between European and Indian religious feuds are invalid. Islam is democratic, levelling, iconoclastic, and proselytizing; Hinduism is hierarchic, if not aristocratic, founded on inequality and rarely showing the crusading spirit of its rival. Islam is simple, plain, little concerned with ritual, crusading in spirit and flourishing in action. Hinduism is elaborate, fulfilling much of its purpose in ritual, manifold and luxuriant in its interpretation of the invisible world, and fulfilling its essential spirit in the contemplative withdrawal from the world of human activity. Moreover, Hinduism was and is a system of life from which those not born within the Hindu pale were for ever excluded; and, claiming authority over the whole community, it necessarily regarded any late comer on the Indian scene such as the Moslem or the European literally as outcasts, or persons for whom no place was, or could be, provided in the ranks of Hindu society. In doctrine, Hinduism was pliant, adaptable, and capable of absorbing all manner of beliefs and precepts, but in social action it was rigid and exclusive. And this peculiarity of the Hindu mind largely accounts for the conflict which arose when Hindu India suffered the full brunt of invasion by an intolerant and crusading Islam. The political conquest may have seemed to be complete in a secular sense, but Hinduism as a social and religious force merely bent before the storm and proved its enduring power by outliving, and in many vital respects vanquishing, its own conqueror.

Modern India inherits this legacy from the past. In our own time the struggle between Hinduism and Islam has been sharpened not because the British Raj willed it so, but because the growth of reformatory institutions under British rule provided a new field of rivalry. Competition for seats in the legislature and for employment in the administration revived the feud; and, since the political leaders of Islam in India feared the exclusion of their co-religionists both from representation and from office wherever the Hindus were in a majority, they demanded separate electoral rolls of their own in which none but Mohammedans should vote. Thus the growth of democratic institutions in India led to the undemocratic result of segregating Moslem from Hindu electors in "communal" constituencies which tended to perpetuate their separation. This would point to a hopeless prospect of permanent estrangement were it not for the fact that, at the very time

when the conflict seems sharpest, social and economic objects of common concern to the rank and file of both communities have begun to claim attention, both from the Indian public as a whole, and from the popularly elected legislatures. And the most hopeful feature to-day is that, on the whole, the younger generation are less inclined than their elders to allow religious disputes to distract them from the task of social reform. The programmes of the legislatures have been increasingly concerned in recent years with what Carlyle was wont to call "the Condition of the People Question." The standard of living everywhere; agrarian problems of landlord and tenant; the relations of labour and capital in urban industry; the vital need for a complete system of public education; the position of women in the community; and the general development of natural resources—these are becoming the foremost questions of the day. Their claims are challenging the old conception of politics as the battlefield of sectarian strife; and, though the communal struggle seems (at the moment) to fill the scene almost to the exclusion of everything else, none the less there is reason to hope that it will gradually recede into the background before the pressing demands of India's social and economic needs.

Another factor of growing power is the awakening of Indian women to a new conception of their service to the community. In times gone by the women were one of the great bastions of orthodoxy. Conservative by function and nature, they were wont to exercise a restraining influence upon their men-folk returning from the outside world to the family circle and to recall them from the transient claims of politics to a more abiding loyalty to the central truths of Hinduism or Islam. Seclusion behind *pardah* separated the women of India from the moving world of current events. This seclusion has only gradually been breached by many forces operating on Indian life; some of them Christian in origin and purpose, some of them nationalist and political, some commercial and industrial, others merely secular in a thousand various manifestations. The net result in our time is that, after ages of subjection and seclusion, the leaders of the women of India claim and exercise a new right on behalf of their sex. The process of emancipation is far from complete; and the fulfilment of the hopes of Indian women will depend on the general progress of Indian society as a whole. Education, political opportunity, and economic advancement, in raising the standard of Indian life, should simultaneously raise the status of women. There is a hard core of instinctive resistance to change still to be broken; but you have only to look at the ranks of the Indian army of progress to-day to see that the women of India now bring a reinforcement to the national

purpose, unknown and unconceived in the past. And I believe that, in common with the youth of India, the women are disposed to leave behind the communal quarrels of their fathers and turn towards a new future of hope.

II. THE BRITISH RAJ

On December 31, 1600, Queen Elizabeth signed the Charter of the East India Company. Twenty-eight years later Charles I created the Company of Gentlemen and Merchants trading to Massachusetts. Thus, at the threshold of the seventeenth century the great Queen and her oblique Stuart descendant launched two enterprises which contained within them the seeds of the British Empire in the East and the British Empire in the West. It would be a fascinating study in comparative or contrasted growth to trace the diverging courses of these two from the days of "Company" enterprise through the American War of Independence and the Durham Report to the Statute of Westminster and the Cripps Mission. For that undertaking there is no room here. But, though East and West pursued their divergent destinies for three centuries and the original parent of both Empires had much to learn before these two could be made one, the twentieth century now witnesses them converging into a unity of purpose which even the genius of Elizabeth could not foresee.

There are many landmarks on both roads, to which the reader may like to refer in the Table of Parallel Dates¹. Here we must confine ourselves to the Eastern road, and the first date to note in passing is 1661, when Charles on his marriage to Catherine of Braganza acquired Bombay as the personal possession of the Crown. Eight years later he transferred it to the East India Company and thus gave them their most important foothold in Western India. The Company's Charter had been renewed and extended by Cromwell in 1657; Charles II granted the Company another Charter in 1661, and it was renewed by Queen Anne in 1709. Each renewal marked the growth of the Company in power and possessions. Its continuous transformation from a purely trading corporation into a political organ which was a government in all but name is one of the political facts of the time. One Indian constitutional writer actually calls it a "Sovereign Corporation" and the powers granted to it by successive Acts of Parliament substantially justify the title.

(1) See p. 61.

Indeed, when we come down to 1773 we find the Company so much in need of control that Parliament was moved to enact that control in the form of the "Regulating Act," under which the office of Governor-General was first created and a new responsibility of the Company to Whitehall laid down. Eleven years later the greater statute universally called "Pitt's Indian Act" established the Board of Control in London which was the forerunner of the Secretary of State for India in Council. The Company was still the executive authority in India, but the bounds of its governing power were more and more circumscribed by the Home Government. The Charter was renewed every twenty years, and when the Bill providing for its periodical renewal was presented to Parliament in 1813 Lord Grenville—the Grenville of the "Ministry of All the Talents" that came to grief in 1807—delivered a speech which sounded a keynote. It was a note which could be heard again, one hundred and four years later, when another speaker, again in the midst of a great war, was to foreshadow great changes in the situation of Indian Government. Lord Grenville, describing the subject of the Bill as one which "knows no example," said that the policy had three purposes.

The *first* was "to declare British sovereignty, the sovereignty of the Crown being the only foundation on which we can either discharge our duties or maintain our rights. . . The British Crown is *de facto* sovereign in India. How it became so it is needless to inquire. This sovereignty cannot now be renounced without still greater evils, both to that country and to this, than even the acquisition of power has ever yet produced. It must be maintained. . . That sovereignty which we hesitate to assert, necessity compels us to exercise." A characteristic case of political action where the principle was left to look after itself!

The *second* purpose must be the welfare of the people of India, and the *third*, the interests of Great Britain. "Pursued with sincerity," said Grenville, "and on the principles of a just and liberal policy, there exists between them a close connection, a necessary and mutual dependence." And he threw out, almost as a casual afterthought, the suggestion that the evils of patronage in the appointment of civil servants might be avoided by selecting "writers," i.e., the trained employees of the Company, "by free competitive and public examination from our great schools and universities." Here Grenville was only forty years in advance of his time. The Act of 1813, as passed, fell short of these ideals; and its successors, in 1833 and in 1853, marked no epoch, nor made any radical change. The prevailing note was caution.

The Parliament which had just enacted the Reform Act of 1832 for the British people had no clear idea whither it was moving in Indian affairs. Even James Mill changed his tone, when he turned from the British to the Indian problem, saying, "We have to engraft on despotism the natural fruits of liberty . . . it behoves us to be cautious even to the verge of timidity." And twenty years later the same zealous advocate of free institutions could still say, "This Bill is not final; it ought to be a large yet cautious step in the path of progress."

Such was the mood in which the political treatment of India was envisaged just before the Mutiny. And when that upheaval swept away the rule of the Company there were few to regret its passing, but fewer still who recognized that corruption and misgovernment were not the sole characteristics of its history, and that the legacy it bequeathed had much good, if also much evil. The evil part of "John Company's" work was surgically amputated from the body politic of India by the knife of the Mutiny; the good "lived after," in the tradition of personal service to the people which had been the watchword of many a district officer and "collector" throughout John Company's career. And in appraising the function of the Company, during the two hundred and fifty-eight years which separate the reigns of the *two* great Queens who created and ended this organ of British enterprise in the East, we must judge it by the standards of the time. That judgment the Company itself claimed in its last words, in the Petition presented to Parliament in 1858, while the memory of the Mutiny was still hot and bitter in England as in India. The Directors did not "seek to vindicate themselves at the expense of any other authority"; they claimed "their full share of responsibility of the manner in which India has practically been governed . . . not to them a subject of humiliation but of pride." They claimed that theirs was "one of the most rapidly improving governments of the world . . . and that whatever improvements may be hereafter effected in India, can only consist in the development of germs already planted."

There was some truth, but too much complacency, in the Company's claim. The system thus defended was out of date; and on August 12, 1858, "An Act for the Better Government of India" brought the Company's rule to an end. Three weeks later the Court of Directors, in their "last solemn assembly," accepted the verdict and handed the new Empire to the Sovereign in words not unworthy of the occasion: "Let Her Majesty appreciate the gift—let her take the vast country and the teeming millions of India under her direct control; but let her not forget the corporation from which she has received them, nor the lessons to be learned from its success." And to "their Servants in the East" the

Company sent their "last instructions"; "The Company has the great privilege of transferring to the service of Her Majesty such a body of civil and military officers as the world has never seen before. A government cannot be base, cannot be feeble, cannot be wanting in wisdom, that has reared two such services as the civil and military services of the Company." With these words John Company's Servants became the Indian Civil Service. There is a fine, almost defiant, ring in them; and those who cherish the record of the Indian Civil Service in our own time will not grudge the claim made here by the Court of Directors on behalf of their "Servants in the East."

The Act of 1858 was a turning point in British Indian relations. The historic occasion was marked by the Queen's Proclamation of Amnesty and Clemency in November, in which she renounced all further "extension of our present territorial possessions"; undertook to "respect the rights, dignity, and honour of the native princes as our own"; pledged herself to give India good government, justice, religious toleration, and progress; and opened for Indians the door to participation in the administration. To all concerned she said, "In your prosperity will be our strength, in your contentment our security, in your gratitude our best reward."

In these words the Queen signed the birth certificate of the Government of India, created by the Act of 1858 in a form which was to outlast her own reign and only to be transformed once more by the Act of 1919. The regime thus inaugurated completed the unity of India under one rule, the British Raj; it confirmed the rule of law and gave India as a country, and the Indian as a citizen, security and civil rights; it followed the example which had been set by the Company in abolishing *suttee* (the burning of widows) and *thuggee* (murder as a sacrifice to the Goddess Kali, which was often sheer gangster crime as well); it developed communications, conserved forests, promoted irrigation and widespread agricultural improvement. It could claim that, by these measures, it had not only brought to bay and finally defeated famine, the greatest of Indian scourges, but that, by far-sighted and prudent finance, it had incurred hardly one anna of debt which was not returned to India many times over as the result of productive expenditure. Apart from a small proportion of the public debt incurred in the defence of the Indian frontier, the burden of indebtedness was, in fact, no burden at all: for the greater part of the loans issued, from the Mutiny to the War of 1914, was designed to serve productive works which increased the wealth of India in a degree incomparably greater than their capital cost. True it is that the bulk of this debt was in sterling,

and that India must therefore pay interest to an alien bond-holder; but in the exchange both parties to the contract derived substantial benefits. India bought the manufactured products of British industry, railway equipment, machinery for irrigation, pedigree bulls, and a hundred other instruments for her own needs, and paid for them in Indian wheat, tea, jute, cotton, etc. India could reckon that she had acquired a capital equipment of permanent value, which would continue to earn a yearly return for her people, because it was the very foundation of their economic existence.

During the same period John Company's "Servants in the East" were transformed into the Indian Civil Service, at once a more reliable and responsible body of administrators than their predecessors had any chance of being. The "I.C.S." rapidly earned their well-known reputation by performing their complex and unusual duties in a manner equalled only by the Dutch in their Indies during the same period. Often stigmatized as "sun-dried bureaucrats" by those who could find few appropriate epithets by which to belittle their work, they performed their task in such a way as to justify their more common description as "Ma-Bap," the father and mother of the people in their charge. The civil servant in India was not a mere cog in the administrative machine as most civil servants are in the United Kingdom. He was at one and the same time a civil servant or a judge, a promoter of local enterprise, an instigator of agricultural improvement and an arbiter between conflicting elements in society. There is no resemblance between the task of the Civil Service in our Western democracies, and the infinitely more fascinating task of the civil servant in India. Therefore, when the Indian critic denounces the Indian Civil Service as a burden on the life of India he is not only unjust, but he ignores the nature of the task which the Indian Civil Service has performed.

The Indian Civil Service were doubtless inclined to say that "whatever is best administrated is best," and thus to regard "politics as the enemy of good administration." But, judged in the light of the task entrusted to them, in the light of the conditions prevailing during the half-century that followed the Mutiny they must be reckoned as one of the forces which made modern India. Moreover, when the new India arose to thrust the political issue of India's future into the forefront of the stage, this very service of "sun-dried bureaucrats" threw up man after man capable of playing a political part not usually demanded of the mere administrator. This adaptability was displayed in a marked degree after the last war when the leaders of the Indian Civil Service were required to perform the new functions of parliamentary government in

the representative bodies of the Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution. The India which they went out to serve as young men had so changed before their very eyes that in the years of their maturity they had to transform themselves from administrators into parliamentary leaders of debate. But since this new India of modern times was, in true origin and character, the product of forces which were neither political nor administrative, but arose out of India's response to the whole message of Western thought, we must endeavour to probe the roots whence it sprang.

The Hindu world was the first in Asia to meet the onset of Western thought; and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when this tide began to flow in strength, India was weak. The Mogul Empire had fallen; Indian thought had become stagnant, and the small minority of those whose minds were really alive sought inspiration in vain from indigenous sources. For a brief period the ideal of a union of Hindu and European learning attracted the best minds. Warren Hastings had founded the Calcutta Madrasa to encourage Islamic studies, and the creation of the Sanskrit College at Benares denoted another attempt to revive the failing life of indigenous learning. But Indians themselves had lost faith in their own heritage; and the scholarly Bengali, for instance, seemed ready to reject his own language as "a fantastic thing, unintelligible, foolish, and full of unmeaning, vain pedantry." When Raja Ram Mohan Roy, David Hare, and certain British missionaries offered him new life through the teaching of English, he welcomed it with open arms. Thus the field was prepared for Macaulay's famous *Minute on Education* (1835), in which he denounced as waste of time every moment spent on Sanskrit or the study of Hinduism. He proclaimed his "firm belief that if our plans of education (in English) are followed up there will be not a single idolator among the respectable classes in Bengal thirty years hence." So little did he know of the power of Hinduism! But, in the same *Minute*, he made a prophecy as true as his estimate of Indian religion was false. Our Indian fellow-subjects, he said, "having become instructed in European knowledge may in some future age demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come I know not; but . . . whenever it comes, it will be the proudest day in English history."

Now, beneath the arrogant and easy generalizations of Macaulay there was a profound truth and the expression of a great need. India, as we have seen, needed a new life. Never since the coming of the Aryans had indigenous culture sunk so low. Learning was almost dead, and the stream of spiritual life flowed almost unnoticed through a

tangled growth of coarse idolatry. Infanticide and human sacrifice were rife, the consummation of child marriages was legally permissible at any age; the obscenities and prostitution associated with temple worship were openly encouraged and enjoyed, and the remarriage of widows was forbidden by Hindu law. It seemed as if reform could not come from within. And since the weapon of reform was there at hand, in the shape of Western language and culture, the Indian seized it with zest and, aided by the patronage of the British Government, attacked the fortress of orthodoxy. The attack was delivered with such impetuous force, and the defence so supine, that within a few years it swept all before it. The old was condemned and the new exalted to heaven. Hinduism was dismissed as mere superstition, Sanskrit learning was despised, and the whole system of social obligation and ritual in which Hindu society lived and moved and had its being was undermined by reckless iconoclasm. Thus the national faith in old morality and religion was dethroned, but the new worship was a god with feet of clay; and the generation of reformers who originally set out to re-create the old by fusion with the new soon found that their work was snatched from them by revolutionaries who sought to destroy native learning without heed to the consequences.

The movement swept on its way unchecked for some time; but when it was seen that not reform but anarchy was its goal the leaders of Indian thought, both reformers and conservatives, were driven to take stock of the new situation. From their varied interpretation of the trouble different conclusions arose, and it may be convenient here to state succinctly the five results of the Indian Awakening which began roughly in 1800 and is not over yet. First came the intellectual and moral anarchy; second, the recoil from extremes with a tendency to reaction; third, the revival and defence of orthodoxy, which none the less had to acknowledge the need for reform; fourth, the penetration of Christian doctrine and with it the rise of social reform; and fifth and last, the awakening of political ambition. These are not stated in their true chronological order, nor are they independent of one another. The influence of Christianity, for instance, though not responsible for the early anarchy, runs through the other four, and began to operate from 1813, when for the first time the missionaries were given full freedom to settle and work in India. Political ambition was the last in time, though the seed was sown a century ago in the decision to educate India in English. And social reform was comparatively late in coming, owing more to Christian influence than to official policy or to the demands of the earlier generation of Indian politicians.

A complete account of these movements could only be given in a comprehensive history of India in the nineteenth century. For such a task there is no room in these pages; and we must therefore select the significant, even at the cost of ignoring many phenomena which are important in themselves. We are concerned here with India as the theatre of the drama of the East and West; and we may find the most noteworthy feature of the whole scene now being enacted in the contrast between two of the great results of the Awakening which may be stated thus: during the time when Hinduism, under the increasing stress of the modern inroad of Western culture, was turning back to the springs of its own life and seeking there new strength with which to resist the attack, the educated classes who formed the politically-minded minority of India were demanding with ever-growing insistence the wholesale adoption of Western institutions of government. The orthodox leaders were fighting to retain an essentially aristocratic and hierarchic system, while the political reformers sought to establish a new Indian society on a modern foundation. Neither group was democratic either in form or in spirit.

But both the historic India of Hindu tradition and the new political India of to-day are at one in desiring a fuller right of self-expression. Both of them were and are often found in alliance against the Government of India, and their co-operation for the political purpose of opposition to an alien ruler tends to conceal the fundamental hostility of their aims and ideals. Whether Hindu tradition can reconcile itself with modern democracy is perhaps the very heart of India's problem now, and in days to come. Meanwhile the foundation of political unity has been supplied mainly by the action of the British Raj. In former times unity hardly existed. It has come into being by the play of various forces among which are, in their true chronological order: the English language, the growth of communications by rail and post, economic development, and the rise of political nationalism. We have seen how the English language was made the principal instrument of education, and its most important consequence in the political field has been the part which it has played in providing a *lingua franca* for the different peoples of India who otherwise had no common medium. Thus our language and the rule of the British Raj have brought about in India a result which no other force in history had achieved; political India was brought to birth, and united India became an accessible ideal. The effect upon the political task of Great Britain can be measured by comparing the declaration in which Queen Victoria proclaimed her purpose, on assuming the title of Empress of India in 1876, with the proclama-

tion of the British Government in 1917. The Queen pledged England to give India good government, justice, toleration, and progress; she opened for Indians the door to administrative employment in their own country; but she said no word of democracy or a form of Indian Government responsible to any authority but the Crown and the Imperial Parliament. Political India, as we know it, still lay in the womb of time. In 1917 so greatly had the problem changed that the Government of the day took a new objective in "the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." The course by which this conclusion was reached is worth tracing briefly, for it reveals how far Western ideas had penetrated the Indian mind, and how the new India had compelled England to change her traditional view of the destiny of the East.

The change was little short of a revolution. At the time of the Mutiny (1857) there was little or no political nationalism in India, and few indeed were those who conceived of its government as other than a permanent autocracy. The dawn of an Indian political consciousness was not seen for nearly a quarter of a century afterwards; and when it came in the creation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 its heralds were Englishmen as well as Indians. When Allan Octavian Hume drafted the resolutions of the first Indian National Congress in that year he was an alien pioneer showing his Indian fellow-subjects the English road to political power; the Congress, which he inspired, represented only the nascent nationalism, sharpened by political discontent, of a comparatively small class of educated Indians. So meagre was the power of the Congress in its own country that it exercised but little influence over the course of Indian policy or the character of the Indian Constitution. The legislative bodies were little more than consultative committees attached to the executive government, and the number of Indians holding responsible positions was small. The half century which lay between the Mutiny and the reforms of 1909 witnessed great economic changes accompanied by a growth of political consciousness which prepared the stage for the actors now performing on it. It was a period of growing prosperity and comparative calm in which the agitation now so familiar began to raise its head only towards the end of the nineteenth century.

The new factor of political unrest found its first incarnation in Bal Gangadhar Tilak, its second and greater in Mahatma Gandhi. Never were two political leaders more sharply contrasted. Tilak was a nationalist hating British rule because it was the result of alien conquest, and, as a Hindu, hating it even more because it had brought to India the

forces of Western civilization which would dim the ancient glories of Hinduism and undermine the foundations of Hindu belief. He was a realist, using old weapons and forging new ones for his campaign against the British Raj, and he would use force without stint. The other's motives spring from the same source; but his temper and tactics are at the opposite pole from Tilak's. He also is a Hindu, though of a lower caste, and a patriot, but his belief in non-coöperation and in passive resistance has made the Swaraj movement in India a different instrument of nationalism compared with its aggressive bent under Tilak. There have been times when Gandhi's leadership has provoked the same results as Tilak deliberately sought in his Bombay campaign forty years ago; but, whether Gandhi knew that his propaganda must produce them or not, he has always recoiled from their violence, doing penance by fasting when disorder broke loose. Neither has he ever shown much interest in political or constitutional reform. In Gandhi's mind indifference to the forms and formulae of constitutional government doubtless arises from his belief that the salvation of India will be won in the realm of the spirit and not in the field of politics. Thus it is idle to look in the Mahatma's speeches or writings for any constructive contribution to the problem as we see it. Had this not been so, the Mahatma might have been able to see that, in the course of his life-time, and indeed of men younger than he, the constitutional position in India has been completely transformed. When he was born, India was correctly described as a Dependency: to-day she has within her grasp the status which has already conferred political sovereignty on all the other Dominions of the Crown.

It is literally within his life-time that this change has come about. Gandhi was four years old when Disraeli passed the Royal Titles Act through Parliament making Victoria Empress of India. He was twelve years old when the Indian National Congress, of which he was destined to become the virtual dictator, was first created. And he has lived to see the War Cabinet of 1942 offer India the mandate of self-government in the Draft Declaration which Sir Stafford Cripps presented to him and the other Indian leaders in April 1942. The nationalism which he represents and the political institutions of India have, so to speak, developed together. The first awakening of a political demand produced within a few years certain reforming changes in the political structure; and, though it is sometimes difficult when national movements develop with speed for reform to keep pace with them, none the less, there can be traced throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century a definite correspondence between them. We have already described the stages

of the political awakening of modern India. We have seen how it first arose out of the impact of Western ideas upon the Indian mind after they had been conveyed by the vehicle of education in English. We have also seen that between the date of the decision to make the English language the medium of higher education and the date of the founding of the National Congress there stretched a period of fifty years. Within that half century there was little that could be called a national movement. It is sometimes claimed that the Indian Mutiny was the signal that nationalism was already in 1857 a force to be reckoned with. This can hardly be maintained. The revolt was certainly not a nationalist movement in the modern sense of the word. It was an explosion due to many causes, of which the chief were the mistaken policy of the Company and the undisciplined character of their Bengal Army. Far from being a movement in line with the ambitions of the Indian National Congress of to-day, it was the recoil of conservative and traditional India from changes being universally wrought in the nineteenth century; and the recoil was sharpened by the spreading rumour that the British intended to convert Hindus forcibly to Christianity, as Muslim conquerors had forcibly converted them to Islam in days gone by.

The truth is that the National Movement, as we have known it, can almost be described as a twentieth century phenomenon. It was prepared in the nineteenth by the increasing contact between Britain and India, by the large numbers of young Indians who sought education in the United Kingdom, by the growth of internal communications which brought the separated parts of India closer together than they had ever been before, by the influence of Christian missions, and by other influences which could come into play only after India had been substantially united under the single rule of the British Raj. These factors took some little time to create the ferment known as Nationalism; and it may be remarked that the historians of India, be they British or Indian, hardly mention "nationalism" or "political unrest" or "agitation" until after the death of Queen Victoria, or, more truly, till Tilak exploited the plague and famine in the Bombay Presidency to rouse the people against British rule. But from that time onwards the movement takes the centre of the stage and becomes the chief political concern of the Government of India and of Whitehall.

Meanwhile, the character of government in India was undergoing successive changes, each designed to associate Indians more closely with their own public affairs. At first, when the causes of the Mutiny were compelling the Government to create a more capable administration, the emphasis and direction of reform lay in the administrative

field. Queen Victoria's Proclamation of Amnesty and Clemency extended this field to include Indians as civil servants and administrators. But no one paused to examine the question how the feelings of India should find expression inside the Government itself. The question indeed had hardly then been asked. When it was asked, and especially when it became the main concern of the Indian Congress itself, British policy took steps to answer it. Slow, tentative, gradual steps, no doubt; but, even when successive reforms appeared to move with an almost extreme caution, they revealed the Government of India and Whitehall alike increasingly responsive. Let us see how that responsiveness found expression.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, constitutional authority lay entirely in the hands of Parliament, using as its executive instrument the Secretary of State for India to whom the Government of India was completely subordinate. The Governor-General presided over his own Legislative Council which was little more than a legislative committee attached to the executive, with an official majority tempered by limited Indian representation. In each of the Provinces a similar situation prevailed. But, before long, it was clear that India had outgrown the constitutional garment of the nineteenth century. A revolutionary movement arose in Bengal in 1902, soon spreading to the Punjab and other Provinces; British goods were freely boycotted; agitation grew in violence, culminating in the murder of Sir Curzon Wyllie in London in 1909. Parallel with this proof that a new India was in being a radical change in British opinion carried the famous Liberal Government of 1906 into power with a mandate of sweeping reform; but it was not till 1909 that Parliament took the Indian situation in hand. The Act of that year abolished the official majority in the provincial legislatures, but retained it at the centre, increased popular representation, and, by a fateful decision, conceded separate representation to the Moslem community, and to some others. In retrospect, the Act of 1909 is seen as a link in the chain of gradual development, but so far as the Provinces were concerned it held the fatal flaw of an irresponsible majority in the provincial legislatures, increasing popular representation, but withholding power. Lord Morley, Radical as he was, told the House of Lords that he would not have sponsored the measure if he thought that it implied responsible government. Thus could a Liberal Secretary of State as late as 1909 deny that his measures would inevitably lead to the goal he repudiated.

Four years after Lord Morley's Act came into operation, the First World War broke out. In that war India played a striking part. Indian

troops served on many fronts, adding new distinction to the laurels won by the Indian Army in past times; while Indian industry, still in its infancy compared with the industry of the Western Powers, played no inconsiderable part, and thus gave promise of the service it was destined to render in the Second World War of to-day. But the strain imposed on the Indian peoples by this effort, and the expectations aroused in many Indian minds of the political reward earned by it, created a condition of ferment in India which showed that new measures must be devised to meet a new situation. Of this condition the Government of India were well aware; and, therefore, before the First World War ended, they invited the War Cabinet in London to make a new departure. Thus it was that the famous Declaration of 1917 was made. By it Mr Lloyd George's Government proclaimed the purpose of Britain in India to be "the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the Empire." Following this declaration, Mr Edwin Montagu (then Secretary of State for India) went to India to consult with the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford. The result of their deliberations was the now famous Montagu-Chelmsford Report which holds a high place among Indian political documents. It gave birth to the Act of 1919.

Thus it came about that ten years after Lord Morley had repudiated all intention to promote self-government in India, his successors found that he had made inevitable the very conclusion he denied. The Act of 1919, in fact, carried India a long way towards that goal. Its character is best seen, not in the constitutional provisions of its clauses, but in the policies to which it gave birth. During the first years of its operation India secured tariff autonomy by which the Indian Legislature imposed new customs duties under a system of "discriminating protection," brought to an end the privileged position of the Lancashire textile industry in the Indian market, and laid the foundations of indigenous heavy industry. In this respect a vital part of sovereignty passed, by agreement, from British to Indian hands; and under one of those conventions which (in British political practice) mean more than any statute the British Cabinet undertook not to exercise its statutory right of control in any case where the Government of India and the Legislature were in agreement. Here again the transfer of sovereignty was, almost silently, promoted. Moreover, the history of the Act of 1919 records the rapid increase in the number of Indians in all the administration services, and the first steps in the Indianization of the officers' corps of the Indian Army, as part of a radical programme of Indian Army reform executed by the Commander-in-Chief (Lord Rawlinson) aided by the

most remarkable band of British officers that has served in India in modern times, of whom General Auchinleck was one.

Now, in the strict law of the Constitution, final authority still rested in London. The Act of 1919 gave to the Viceroy the power to "certify" any measure which he judged necessary for "the safety, tranquillity, or interests of British India" and by the exercise of this power he could override the vote of the Legislature. In *actual fact*, this power was rarely used; but, as a reserve power in the hands of the Governor-General it stood in the statute as a reminder of the ultimate British authority in Indian affairs. Both the Government of India and the new legislatures were subordinate *in theory*; and, since the letter of law always catches the Indian eye, the substance of these practical changes was too often ignored. Moreover, there were occasions on which the Indian public were sharply reminded that the last word did not lie with their representatives; and these occasions—e.g., Lord Reading's "certifying" the increase of the Salt Tax in order to balance the Budget of 1923—were seized as reminders of the continuing power of "Whitehall." And, such indeed, they were! But the shrewd eye could see that these incidents were exceptions to the general rule then coming into force, by which the will of India was growing more and more effective. Speaking in Calcutta in 1923, Lord Hailey (then Sir Malcolm Hailey, the Finance Minister in the Government of India) said that the Legislative Assembly, which had been derided as a thing of nought by Indian Nationalists in 1920, had survived the storms of its birth to become "the cynosure of every Indian eye." Lord Hailey was no mean witness, for he had daily experience in Delhi of the practical power of his Indian colleagues in the legislature; and his words received an emphatic—if unexpected—endorsement when the Nationalist Party reversed its tactics of boycott and decided to enter the Legislature which they had scorned only three years before. Moreover, the system of Dyarchy, by which Indians obtained an enlarged share in provincial government, widened the area of autonomy. To the observer of 1942 this twenty-one-year-old story may seem ancient history; but those who took part in that critical passage of Indian politics will always remember that, inadequate as the Act of 1919 now seems, it carried India over the first difficult transition from "autocracy" to "liberation." In that service it has no mean place in Indian political history.

But, as time marches on, and political institutions must march with it, the Act of 1919 had to give place to even larger measures. The very operation of the Act itself engendered forces which demanded its supersession by a more liberal Constitution. Indian Nationalism was growing

apace, and the ambition which it voiced could not be denied. Nor did the Act itself offer to deny the possibility of its supersession; for Parliament specifically enacted the provision that, after ten years, a Statutory Commission be appointed to inquire "into the working of the system of government, the growth of education, and the development of representative institutions in British India . . ." Before these ten years had passed the situation demanded inquiry of the kind contemplated by the Act, and the Commission was actually appointed in 1927 with Sir John Simon as Chairman. It was composed exclusively of Members of the two Houses of Parliament; and Parliament in so confining its membership seemed deliberately to emphasize the fact that the sovereign decision rested with it and with no one else. Ten years before, Mr Montagu had told the House of Commons that "we must be the judges of the time and measure of each advance, and we must be guided by the co-operation received from those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred, and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility." Both the Secretary of State in 1917 and Parliament itself in 1927 were constitutionally correct in their attitude; but it may be doubted whether it was politic to make the Commission of the latter year a purely parliamentary inquiry and only to associate Indians with the Commission after it had commenced operations.

The Commission spent two years on its exhaustive inquiry; but, though its Report gave the best conspectus of the whole Indian problem ever made, the ink was hardly dry upon it when Mr MacDonald's Cabinet resolved upon a different treatment of the matter. This new departure of 1930 showed that there was substance in the doubt expressed above; for the decision to summon the Round Table Conference of that year, by bringing Indians of all parties into equal consultation with British leaders, broadened the basis of treatment and went far to meet one of the main Indian demands. The Round Table Conference, meeting in first session in 1930, was the most representative assembly ever convened to consider the Indian problem. Seated at the table in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords were the leaders of all the British parties, of all Indian parties (with the significant exception of the Congress), of the Indian States, the Depressed Classes, Commerce, Industry, and Labour. His Majesty King George V struck the keynote of this historic occasion when, in opening the proceedings on November 12, 1930, he said: "More than once a Sovereign has summoned historic assemblies on the soil of India, but never before have British and Indian statesmen and rulers of Indian States met, as you

now meet, in one place and round one table to discuss the future system of government for India and seek agreement for the guidance of my Parliament as to the foundations on which it must stand."

The Conference responded to this summons by resolving to create an Indian Federal Union embracing both British India and the Indian States. The moment was one of enthusiasm and hope. It seemed at first as if the acceptance of a common ideal had brought all parties so much nearer together than ever before that obstacles hitherto insurmountable could be overcome. Indeed, so much importance did Indian public opinion attach to the result of this first Session that the Congress Party found it necessary to reverse their boycott and to authorize Mr Gandhi to attend the second Session which opened on September 7, 1931. Mr Gandhi thus appeared as the sole representative of the Congress, and claimed that he spoke for "India." In spite of the manifest exaggeration of his claim, his presence aroused some expectation that he would seize the opportunity created by the favourable atmosphere of the first Session to seek a *rapprochement* with the Moslems. But it soon became evident that he had no such purpose in mind; and the net result of the second Session was to bring to the forefront once more the problems which must be solved before the Federal Union could arise on a stable foundation. These were: the vexed communal question between Hindu and Moslem, the position of the Depressed Classes, the specific terms on which the Indian States would consent to enter the Federation, and the problem of Federal finance. Of these four the crux lay in the first and the third; and so long as the Hindu-Moslem issue remained acute little progress could be made with any of the others.

A word must here be said about the untoward influence of the world crisis on the whole climate of the Conference as it proceeded from session to session. Not only did the Great Depression of 1929-33 make a radical change in the British political atmosphere, leading to the Coalition Government of 1931 under MacDonald-Baldwin leadership, but in India it provoked widespread disturbances which reacted heavily against the whole purpose of the Conference. The far-reaching effect of this renewed outbreak of disorder can only be appreciated if it is seen in relation to all that had gone before. Civil disobedience was rampant in India during the sojourn of the Simon Commission in the country, 1928-1930, and it continued after their return home. And in spite of the realistic endeavour of the Commission's Report to set the whole Indian problem in its true light—perhaps because of it—the Report itself did nothing to pour oil on the troubled waters. Quite the reverse in fact! Thus it was that Lord Irwin, then Viceroy (better

known now as Lord Halifax), found himself in the position, early in 1931, of trying to create anew the favourable atmosphere in which a new effort could be made to approach a final solution of the whole problem. His first object was to compose a conflict which disturbed every Indian enterprise, ruined the ordinary business of every Indian town, and seriously embarrassed the administration and the finances of his own Government. He accordingly sought a *modus vivendi* with Mr Gandhi himself. In the result, the Irwin-Gandhi Pact of March 1931 brought civil disobedience to an end and paved the way for the second Session of the Round Table Conference.

The Round Table Conference completed its labours in three sessions and carried the whole problem to the threshold of final solution. Its principal result was seen in the enactment by Parliament of the Act of 1935 which made India a Federal Union, thus in statutory terms at least fulfilling the promise of the Round Table Conference. The Act provided for self-government in all the Provinces and for a federal centre in which political power, in all but defence and foreign policy, would be wielded by Indian Ministers. But between the moment when Royal sanction was given to the Act and the moment when the Federation could come into being lay a long period of fulfilment which could only be accomplished stage by stage. Federal India required the operation of self-government in its constituent parts, the Indian Provinces; it required a measure of agreement between the Hindu, Moslem, Sikh, and Depressed Classes on their respective parts in the Central Government; it required the acceptance in precise form of the place of the Indian States in the Federation; and it required the financial settlement assigning sources of revenue within the Federation. For lack of the completion of these requirements Federal India was not in being when the war broke out. In the eleven Provinces the new regime was in fact in operation and still operates in five of them. In the other six the Congress Ministers resigned as a protest against the attitude of the Government of India at the outbreak of war.

The Second World War has many disasters to record; but in no field of political endeavour has its influence been more untoward than in the field of Indo-British relations. If the war had not thrust its irrelevant finger into the Indian problem it is fair to say that the treatment of the problem would have been transferred to where it properly belongs, namely, to India herself. But the outbreak of the war caught India midway between the control of Whitehall and her own authority as a self-governing country. Thus, in no area of the world has Hitler provoked more trouble than in India. His aggression compelled all his

enemies and all his victims elsewhere to close their ranks; but in India the ranks were so divided that even his challenge to India's destiny failed to engender unity in defence against him. India was still deeply engaged in her controversy with Britain when the war broke out. And because in inescapable physical fact as well as in constitutional form India was automatically at war when the King was at war, the Indian Congress Party felt compelled to refuse their co-operation. India thus appeared to present to the world the picture of a house divided against itself in that hour of supreme decision. None the less India played a sterling part in the struggle; and, political controversy notwithstanding, the Indian war effort was worthy of her well-known martial record.¹

III. THE CRISIS OF 1942

The Cripps Mission to India was the outstanding political event of the early spring of 1942. Sir Stafford himself was the visible proof of Britain's determination to leave no stone unturned in the endeavour to bring about a settlement both of the problem of India's part in the war and of the ultimate political destiny of the country.

It has been the fashion to speak of the failure of his Mission. In the strict sense of the visible result achieved it is doubtless true to say that he did not succeed; but it is neither fair to him, nor in accordance with the facts, to describe his endeavour as barren. Not only did he at a moment of critical deadlock in Anglo-Indian relations transport the whole problem into a new climate of opinion, but added an important element to the structure of a permanent settlement. The foundation was already laid long before; and it is not strictly true to describe either the unaccepted Declaration of His Majesty's Government or the substance of British policy which it represents as a radical departure from the main line of British purpose in India. The Declaration was, in its intention and in its terms, the natural heir of the policy adopted by the British Government in its original Declaration of 1917, and in most of the political developments which have taken place in India since that date. The candid observer studying British policy both in the form of official Declarations made from time to time, and in the actual Statutes passed by Parliament, cannot escape the conclusion that the Cripps Mission, while a welcome novelty in manner and in the person of its performer, was actually an accelerated movement in a process of political evolution already under way.

(1) See Chapter V.

In what sense, then, could the situation be described as new? The Cripps Mission made explicit what was sometimes openly declared, but more often implicit, in the statements of the British Government from time to time. But more pertinent and fertile than an exposition of policy is the fact that Sir Stafford himself created a new atmosphere. It is true that the Congress leaders described the new proposals as inadequate, and allowed themselves to say that the Cripps Mission had only embittered feeling. None the less, most observers took the opposite view; and, since atmosphere is always more important than proposals and institutions (and nowhere is this truer than in India), it may be said that Sir Stafford's achievement lay in the clearing of the skies and to some extent in the clearing of the ground as well. He made plain, what was already known to those who have followed closely the course of British Indian policy in the past generation, that the real obstacle to further progress did not lie in the reluctance of the Government and people of Great Britain to recognize the political rights of India, but that it lay in conditions which are inherent in the Indian problem itself. It might almost be said that the result of his Mission was to make the problem henceforth less one of Anglo-Indian controversy and more one which can find its solution only within the bounds of the Indian peninsula.

Let us look at the diary of events which led to the Cripps Mission. The war caught India in the middle of a difficult passage of Constitutional development. It provoked an old issue in a new and critical form. In law, India was at war when Britain was at war; and therefore, constitutionally speaking, no issue would arise. The enemy was at war with India, and India was at war with the enemy, and from these inexorable facts there was no escape. None the less, much more could have been done, and should have been done, to give India the opportunity of going to war by a political act of her own, performed by her existing representatives. It would have been feasible, tactical, and wise to have provided the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State with an opportunity to declare by resolution the hostility of India to the Axis, the determination of peoples of India to cast in their lot with the Allies, and in the customary words of a Resolution by either House of the Indian Legislature to "recommend to the Governor-General in Council that he do inform His Majesty of the purposes and desires of India thus expressed." Such action not having been taken, India, unlike the Dominions, automatically followed the United Kingdom into the war. Ordinances were passed giving wide emergency powers to the Government of India. These steps were taken without

discussion in either the Central or the Provincial Legislatures as the Viceroy had sole power over Defence and Foreign Affairs. On September 11, 1939, the Viceroy announced the suspension of that part of the Act of 1935 which created the Federal Union. The rest of the Act, which was already in operation and had brought responsible Indian Ministries into being in all the eleven Provinces, continued unaffected. And it may be noted here that the seven Provincial Ministries which resigned shortly after the outbreak of war did so for reasons arising out of the war and not because *provincial* self-government was not a reality.

The Congress Party were opposed to taking part in any war, save by the consent of the Indian people, and their members withdrew from the Assembly as a protest against the sending of Indian troops out of the country without the consent of the Legislature. On September 15, 1939, the Congress Working Committee issued a Manifesto protesting against India's being declared a belligerent without her consent, and demanding the right of the Indian people to frame their own Constitution through a Constituent Assembly. On September 18 the Moslem League passed a resolution welcoming the suspension of the Federal part of the 1935 Act because its operation in the Provinces had resulted in the domination of Hindus over Moslems. On October 17 the Viceroy issued a White Paper giving the promise of ultimate Dominion status for India and conveying the British Government's undertaking to consult with representative Indians at the end of the war with a view to modifying the 1935 Act. For the interim period the Government intended to set up a consultative group for "the association of public interest with the conduct of the war." As a protest against the shortcomings of the statement, the Congress Ministries, in November, 1939, resigned in eight Provinces, leaving Indian Ministries still in office in Bengal, the Punjab, and Sind, an alternative Indian Government taking office in Assam. The Moslem League stressed the need for radical revision of the 1935 Act, in a sense congenial to the Moslem demand.

On January 10, 1940, the Viceroy again declared that "full Dominion status in accordance with the Statute of Westminster" was the goal of British policy. To which the Congress Party riposted in March with the demand for nothing short of complete independence, and the Moslem League by adopting the *Pakistan* Scheme. *Pakistan* is a term of recent origin. It is, at once, a territorial conception and an idea. The word was invented by Chaudhuri Rahmat Ali to embrace the territories in North-West India in which Moslems predominate; each letter in it representing a region: P for Punjab, A for Afghanistan or

the Afghan Frontier, K for Kashmir; with *istan* as the termination, as in Hindustan, Afghanistan, Kurdistan, Baluchistan, denoting "*the land of.*" While its inventor had in mind a federation of all Islamic territory in India, other Moslems have employed it to denote the distinctive faith, tradition, and way of life which are embraced in the word Islam, i.e., *Pakistan* or Islam-in-India. During the process of Moslem consolidation, in the period when Hindu control of Provincial Governments forced the Moslems to close their ranks and made the Moslem League a far greater power than ever before, *Pakistan* became a war-cry often used by those who had little conception of what its territorial or political meaning ought to be. In the Indian Round Table broadcast from London Sirdar Iqbal Ali Shah defined it as "the Moslem population breaking away from the main part of Hindu India in order to safeguard its own culture and interests." The name was first officially adopted by the Moslem League in 1940, and since then its unfamiliar sound has become familiar throughout India.

On March 12 the Chamber of Princes passed a resolution welcoming the promise of Dominion Status, but demanding the protection of their rights arising from any treaties, and safeguards for the autonomy of their States. On July 7 the Congress Working Committee again demanded complete independence and the immediate establishment of a provisional National Government in Delhi. On August 8, the Viceroy, recalling the pledge of Dominion Status given in October 1939, declared:—

1. That he was authorized to invite representative Indians to serve on his Council, and to establish a War Advisory Council.

2. In any future Constitutional scheme framed after the war the views of minorities will be given full weight, and His Majesty's Government cannot "contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life. Nor can they be parties to the coercion of such elements into submission to such a government. The constitution must also be framed subject to the due fulfilment of the obligations of His Majesty's Government resulting from their long connection with India.

3. In response to the strong insistence that a future Constitution should be framed primarily on the responsibility of Indians themselves, His Majesty's Government declare that they will readily assent to the setting up, after the conclusion of the war, with the least possible delay, of a body representative of the principal elements in

India's national life to devise the framework of a new constitution. Meanwhile they will welcome and promote, in any way possible, every sincere and practical step that may be taken by representative Indians themselves to reach a basis of friendly agreement, both upon the form which the post-war representative body should take, and the methods by which it should arrive at its conclusions, and, secondly, upon the principles and outlines of the Constitution itself.

The reader should take particular note of the third paragraph which makes explicit the inherent purpose of the Round Table Conference of ten years before, and plainly stands in true lineal descent with the Cripps' Declaration of 1942.

To this pronouncement of August 1940 the Congress Party and the Moslem League alike gave a cold reception. Both refused the co-operation suggested in the first paragraph; and both, for different reasons, expressed their dissatisfaction with the Constitutional prospect held out for the future after the war. In September the Viceroy discussed the position both with Mr Jinnah and with Mr Gandhi (with the latter in an interview lasting nearly four hours), but the deadlock continued. On October 15 Mr Gandhi inaugurated a campaign of "limited" Civil Disobedience. And on December 29 the Hindu Mahasabha (the representative organ of orthodox Hinduism) in full session at Madura (Madras) made the following pronouncement:—

1. While reiterating its faith in the goal of complete independence, the Mahasabha is prepared to accept Dominion status as an immediate step, but urges an immediate declaration that Dominion status will be granted within one year after the war, and, further, that the Constitution will be framed to ensure the "integrity and indivisibility of India while providing legitimate safeguards for the minorities, but not affecting adversely the rights of the majority."

2. The Mahasabha condemns the attitude of the British Government in that they will not entertain any Constitutional scheme unless it is agreed to by the Moslem minority.

3. The Mahasabha requests a declaration that "Pakistan" will not be entertained.

4. The Mahasabha considers the expansion of the Indian Army inadequate, urges accelerated expansion and recruitment of Hindus, compulsory military training in schools, and the expansion of war production.

Within a few weeks, the Moslem League re-stated their position with renewed emphasis in a Resolution (February 24, 1941) in the following terms:—

1. The League views with disapproval recent pronouncements of the Secretary of State, which give the impression, contrary to various announcements, that His Majesty's Government still contemplate a Constitution based on the economic and political unity of India.

2. It reaffirms in unequivocal terms the Pakistan policy as the permanent policy of the League.

3. It condemns the Congress Civil Disobedience campaign which is clearly aimed at coercing the British Government to accept the Congress demands, and warns the British Government that the Moslem League will resist with all the power at its disposal any concession to the Congress which affects or militates against the Moslem demands.

On March 14, 1941, a Liberal Conference under Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru submitted proposals for the immediate reconstruction of the Viceroy's Council to consist entirely of non-official Indians, and the transfer of the portfolios of Defence and Finance to Indians, and for an explicit declaration by the British Government of Dominion Status at the end of the war. In July the Viceroy created *three* new portfolios for Civil Defence, Information, and Indians Overseas; and appointed *five* non-official, non-Party Indians to his Council. A War Advisory Council, including representatives from the Indian States, but none from the Congress or Moslem Parties, was also set up. But these changes did not touch the heart of the situation, and on December 5 a direct appeal was cabled to Mr Churchill (in Washington) from the Moderates urging him to act on their proposals of March, in view of "the gravity of the international situation."

So ended 1941. It was clear to all observers that a real deadlock had been reached. And while it might appear that the War Cabinet could release themselves from its grip by action designed to prove the *bona fides* of British policy, in the sense of making the structure of the Government of India conform to the political demands of the Congress Party, such action would only resolve one deadlock by creating another, in the shape of the failure of the Congress Party and the Moslem League to accept a common solution.

At the same time a new element of mistrust entered the situation when the Atlantic Charter was described as "not applying to India." This statement was made in perfect good faith, but without due regard to its reception by Indian Nationalists. It was made to seem as if the Charter were a boon denied to India, whereas it was evident that the Charter itself, except in the most general terms, did not declare its own application; nor was it primarily, if at all, designed to affect the circum-

stances of the United Nations, including India. Doubt, if any legitimately arose, was due to the form of the Third of the Eight Points which declared that:

"the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom . . . deem it right to make known that . . . they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live . . ."

The right seemed to be addressed to India; but the phrase immediately following:

"and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them"

should have shown that the *whole* of the *Third Point* was conceived as part of a manifesto addressed to the victims of Axis aggression, and to no one else. None the less, India seized upon the words "the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live" as a new opening for a reiterated demand; and it is probable that the Indian reaction to the interpretation of Point Three played some part in the decision to send Sir Stafford Cripps to India.

On March 11 Mr Churchill told the House that Sir Stafford would fly to India forthwith, bearing with him a draft Declaration by H.M. Government.

On March 29 the Declaration was made public. His Majesty's Government, having resolved to take steps for the earliest possible establishment of the institutions of self-government in India, declared:

"The Object is the creation of a new Indian union which shall constitute a Dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs."

"His Majesty's Government therefore make the following declaration:

I. Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities steps shall be taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an elected body charged with the task of framing a new Constitution for India.

II. Provision shall be made, as set out below, for the participation of the Indian States in the Constitution-making body.

III. His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the Constitution so framed, *subject only to:*

(a) The right of any province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new Constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent secession if it so decides. With such non-acceding provinces, should they so

desire, his Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new Constitution giving them the same full status as the Indian union, and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down.

(b) The signing of a treaty which shall be negotiated between His Majesty's Government and the Constitution-making body. This treaty will cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands. It will make provision in accordance with the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government for the protection of racial and religious minorities, but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian union to decide in the future its relationship to the other member States of the British Commonwealth.

Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the Constitution it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its treaty arrangements so far as this may be required in the new situation.

IV. The Constitution-making body shall be composed as follows, unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities agree upon some other form before the end of hostilities:

Immediately upon the result being known of the provincial elections, which will be necessary at the end of hostilities, the entire membership of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures shall, as a single electoral college, proceed to the election of the Constitution-making body by the system of Proportional Representation. This new body shall be in number about one-tenth of the number of the electoral college. Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion to their total population as in the case of the representatives of British India as a whole, and with the same powers as the British Indian members.

V. During the critical period which now faces India and until the new Constitution can be framed, His Majesty's Government inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain control and direction of the defence of India, as part of their world-war effort, but the task of organizing to the full the military, moral, and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India with the co-operation of the peoples of India.

His Majesty's Government desire and invite the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth, and of the United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to give their active and constructive help in the discharge of a task which is vital and essential for the future freedom of India."

In a public statement, Sir Stafford Cripps drew attention to the fact that the Declaration could become operative only "if it met with a

sufficiently general and favourable acceptance from the various sections of Indian opinion." The Declaration sought to turn the mind of India from past feuds to the achievement of union. The word *Union* was the name given by the War Cabinet to the proposed new Constitution, the precise form of which was still unknown, but it would be an Indian Constitution framed by Indians. The Statute of Westminster, in 1931, had given to the Dominions of the British Crown a status of independence and co-operation unique in the history of popular freedom. This Declaration offered to India the same status, with the right of the Indian Union to remain within or go out of the Commonwealth. Minorities unwilling to accede would have the right to demand a plebiscite to remain out. He also indicated that, while one Union embracing all was the primary aim, more than one Dominion was possible under the scheme. In regard to the Indian States acceding to the Union, their terms of agreement with the Union would imply the disappearance of British paramountcy over the States concerned.

As for the immediate predicament of the war, Sir Stafford said that His Majesty's Government must inevitably bear the responsibility for the defence of India and retain the control of her whole fighting effort. In war there could not be divided control; but the task of organizing the full military, moral, and material resources of India would give Indians the fullest opportunity of co-operation. Sir Stafford Cripps discussed the Declaration with the Viceroy, with Pandit Nehru, and other Congress leaders, with the Moslems and with Colonel Louis Johnson. The last-named was President Roosevelt's personal representative, who arrived in Delhi on April 3 to promote co-operation between the United States and India in the war effort, but found himself surrounded by the political atmosphere and played a welcome part in the endeavour to bring conflicting parties together.

On April 1 the Working Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha (the organ of Hindu Orthodoxy) rejected the British proposals, since it could not be a party "to any proposal which involves political partition of India in any shape or form." The demand of the Masasabha was "that India should immediately be declared to be an independent nation with free and equal status in an Indo-British Commonwealth," and the proposal for an interim period during the war before such independence was established, and, particularly, the proposal regarding defence were unacceptable. The Sikh All-Parties Committee also announced its rejection of the scheme, declaring that the provision for separation of the Provinces and the constitution of Pakistan¹ "lamen-

(1) See p. 32.

tably betrayed" the Sikh community, and that it would "resist by all possible means the separation of the Punjab from the All-India Union." The Liberal leaders, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr Jayakar, issued a statement declaring that, if a satisfactory formula could be devised in respect of the Defence Portfolio, the mission of Sir Stafford Cripps might still succeed. They regarded the failure of the plan as likely to produce feelings of disappointment, frustration, and antagonism which would be disastrous in such an hour of crisis.

On April 10 the Congress Working Committee finally rejected the British proposals. While recognizing that self-determination for the people of India was accepted in principle "in that uncertain future," they regretted that it was "fettered and circumscribed," and that provisions had been introduced which gravely imperilled the development of a free and united national Government. Even the Constitution-making body was so constituted that the people's right of self-determination was vitiated by the introduction of non-representative elements. The complete ignoring of 90 million people in the Indian States, and "their treatment as commodities at the disposal of their rulers" was "a negation. both of democracy and self-determination." Such States "might in many ways become barriers to the growth of Indian freedom, enclaves where foreign authority still prevails, and where the possibility of maintaining foreign armed forces has been stated to be a likely contingency and a perpetual menace to the freedom of the people of the States as well as of the rest of India. The acceptance beforehand of the novel principle of non-accession for a province was also a severe blow to the conception of Indian unity . . . The Committee cannot think in terms of compelling the people of any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their will. While recognizing this principle, the Committee feel that every effort should be made to create conditions which would help the different units in developing a common and co-operative national life. Each territorial unit should have the fullest possible autonomy within the union consistently with a strong national State . . . The British War Cabinet encourages attempts at separation at the very inception of the Union, and thus creates friction just when the utmost co-operation and goodwill are most needed."

The reply of the Moslem League, on April 11, stated that: "unless the principle of the Pakistan scheme embodied in its Lahore resolution of March, 1940, is unequivocally accepted, and the right of Mussulmans to self-determination conceded by means of machinery which will reflect the true verdict of Muslim India, it is not possible for the Moslem League to accept any proposal or scheme regarding the future."

On the same day Sir Stafford Cripps broadcast a statement to the Indian people, in which he said that the British War Cabinet had realized that Indian opinion, though united in a desire for full self-government, was widely disunited as to the methods by which it should be attained. Congress, since the outbreak of war, had repeatedly demanded two essentials as a basis for its support of the Allied war effort; first, a declaration of Indian independence; and second, a Constituent Assembly to frame a new and free Indian Constitution. Both these demands found their place in the Draft Declaration, and its central feature was full and free self-government for India. But the British Government had insisted that it must be left to the Indian communities to agree among themselves as to the methods by which this should be attained, and, he continued, "Some day, somehow, the great communities and parties in India will have to agree upon a method of framing their new Constitution." Now, though Sir Stafford Cripps, on realizing that the purpose of his mission had failed, announced that the Draft Declaration could not be turned into an act of policy, it was universally recognized that no British Government, of whatever colour, would ever go back upon it. In whatever manner a new approach is made, the main purpose will not be relinquished nor the goal lost to sight. Any doubt on this matter was removed on July 30, when the Secretary of State for India told the House of Commons that the Government "stood firmly by the broad intention of the offer made in March."

In the period that followed Sir Stafford Cripps's return to England the most critical date was August 7, for on that day the All-India Congress Committee rejected Mr Gandhi's pacifism, but resolved to embark on civil disobedience if their demand for a national Government was not conceded forthwith.¹ It had become increasingly clear during the four months between April and August that there were deep differences of opinion within the Congress Party's ranks. The first sign of dissension appeared on April 30, when Mr Rajagopalachari (former Premier of Madras) resigned from the Congress Working Committee in protest against their intransigent attitude. The course of events before and after Mr Rajagopalachari's action was tortuous and difficult to follow; but certain landmarks stand out on it. On April 19 Mr Gandhi described the British offer as "too ridiculous to find acceptance anywhere." On the 30th Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru said that, though he agreed with Mr Gandhi on the character of the British proposals, "*the question of non-cooperation could not arise because non-cooperation would mean inviting the Japanese to come to India.*" On the 29th, and again on

(1) See p. 43.

May 1 the All-India Congress Committee rejected the British proposals.

Meanwhile, on April 24, Mr Rajagopalachari's friends in Madras sought to persuade the All-India Congress Committee to acknowledge the Moslem League's claim to separation, and urged the Congress leaders to open negotiations with Mr Jinnah in order to create a basis of co-operation in a national Government. On the 25th, Maulana Azad, the President of the Congress, condemned this Madras proposal. Nothing daunted, Mr Rajagopalachari moved a resolution in the All-India Congress Committee asking for recognition of the Moslem demand, but was defeated by 120 votes to 15. And at the same session the Committee refused to consider "any proposals which retain even a partial measure of British control and authority in India." Thus, by the beginning of May, the Congress had taken an uncompromising position, but had not yet decided how to act. Their decision took three months to make; and in those three months the leaders became aware that the threat of non-cooperation in time of war was creating widespread uneasiness, voiced in no uncertain terms by at least two important pro-Congress newspapers, the *Hindu* of Madras, and the *Tribune* of Lahore. Long and anxious consultations took place; and on June 22 it was reported that Mr Gandhi, Pandit Nehru, and Maulana Azad had decided to express the Congress rejection of the British plan in the form of a demand for immediate political freedom, "though, as reported, they were prepared to tolerate the presence of the troops of the United Nations as Allies of a free India." This provoked an immediate Moslem retort, in Mr Jinnah's warning of the same day to the British Government "against any surrender to Congress in a manner detrimental to Moslem interests," and in his declaration of July 4 that the rejection of Pakistan would mean "chaos and disorder."

On July 14 the Congress Working Committee adopted Mr Gandhi's resolution calling for "the immediate withdrawal of British rule from India." The President was at pains to assure the Press that this resolution was "not an ultimatum, but merely a reiteration of the national demand," but Mr Gandhi declared that "there is no time left for negotiation; either they recognize India's independence or they don't. There is no question of 'one more chance' . . . This is open rebellion. I conceive of a mass movement, on the widest possible scale, though of a purely non-violent character." Pandit Nehru admitted that the sudden withdrawal of the British "would involve risks, but *any* risk was better than the risk India faced at present." (For the Pandit's opinion in April, see previous page.) The die was not yet cast: the All-India Committee

had still to endorse the "Quit India" resolution, as it came to be called. And between July 14, when the Working Committee seemed to adopt Mr Gandhi's tactical plan, down to August 7, when the All-India Committee met in Bombay, there was a ferment of anxious and controversial debate. Labour, the Depressed Classes, the Left Wing, led by the ex-Communist, Mr M. N. Roy, not to speak of the Moslem League and the Indian States—these forces appeared to be arrayed solidly against Mr Gandhi. The *Hindu* and the *Tribune* argued forcibly against him, and Dr Ambedkar described his mass-movement of civil disobedience as "irresponsible and insane."

On July 30 the Secretary of State for India stated in the House of Commons that the Government stood firmly by the "broad intention" of the offer made to India by Sir Stafford Cripps. At the same time, being aware of the coming storm, he said that the Government of India "will not flinch from their duty to take every possible step to meet the situation" created by the most recent demand for their withdrawal made by the Congress Party. This demand completely ignored the Government's far-reaching offer of Dominion Status after the war, and would, if conceded, "bring about a complete and abrupt dislocation of the vast and complicated machinery of government in India. This at a time when in Russia, China, Libya, and other theatres of war the situation calls for the undivided energy, co-operation, and concentration of the resources of all the allied Powers." "His Majesty's Government," he continued, "while reiterating their resolve to give the fullest opportunity for the attainment by India of complete self-government, cannot but solemnly warn all those who stand behind the policy adumbrated by the Working Committee of Congress that the Government of India will not flinch from their duty to take every possible step to meet the situation," and it was therefore their earnest hope that the Indian people would "lend no countenance to a movement fraught with such disastrous consequences but will, on the contrary, throw their all into the struggle against the common enemies of mankind."

Before we carry the story of Congress policy to the decision of August 7, we may note that in the course of the summer recruiting for the Indian Army broke all records, and Indian industrial production expanded rapidly. The War Resources Committee, with Sir Hormusji Mody as chairman, accelerated the whole economic war effort of India, carrying out the programme accepted by the Eastern Supply Conference of 1941. The Government of India was enlarged from 12 to 15, including 11 Indian members, and Sir Firoz Khan Noon was appointed Indian Defence Minister. His Highness the Jam Sahab of Nawanagar

and Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar represented India on the Pacific War Council and the British War Cabinet. The result of this activity was to show once more that India, as a whole, had thrown her energies into the war and that the Congress Party could not count on wholehearted popular support for their programme. The Congress leaders had failed to gauge the prevailing sentiment. Not only so, but they were sharply divided over Mr Gandhi's equivocal attitude to Japan: and such was the strength of the feeling against Japanese aggression that Mr Gandhi himself was forced to abandon his "defence by passive resistance to the enemy" when the Party met in Bombay. The Resolution adopted by the All-India Committee—a body 250 strong—was so framed as to offer satisfaction to the main contending groups within the Party, and by this means secured a majority of over 200 votes to 13. Five thousand words in length, the Resolution declared that:—

(1) British rule in India must end immediately because foreign domination is always evil, and because "India in bondage can play no effective part in defending herself";

(2) Ever since the outbreak of the world war Congress had steadily pursued a policy of "non-embarrassment." For this reason it gave civil disobedience a "symbolic" character even at the risk of making it ineffective. It was hoped that this policy of non-embarrassment would be appreciated "and that real power would be transferred to popular representatives so as to enable the nation to make its fullest contribution towards the realization of human freedom throughout the world which is in danger of being crushed";

(3) These hopes, however, were dashed to pieces; the abortive Cripps proposals showed in the clearest possible manner that there was no change in the British Government's attitude to India and that the British hold on India was in no way to be relaxed;

(4) Attempts to negotiate with Sir Stafford Cripps "a minimum consistent with national demand" failed and the result was increased ill-will towards Britain, a growing satisfaction at Japanese successes, and a trend towards passive acceptance of aggression;

(5) All aggression must be resisted since submission would mean degradation for the Indian people and the continuation of their subjection;

(6) Congress wished to change the ill-will against Britain to good will and make India a willing partner in the war. "This is only possible if India feels the glow of freedom";

(7) When British rule is withdrawn responsible men and women will form a Provisional Government and will later convene a Constitutional Assembly to prepare a Constitution;

(8) The representatives of Great Britain and free India will confer together for the adjustment of future relations and for their co-operation as allies;

(9) In making the proposal for the withdrawal of British rule from India, Congress has no desire whatever to embarrass Great Britain or the Allied Powers in their prosecution of the war, and Congress would therefore agree to the stationing of armed forces of the Allies in India. Nor would Congress desire that British citizens living in India should leave India;

(10) Congress appeals to Britain to withdraw British rule, but if the appeal fails Congress will then reluctantly be compelled to utilize all the non-violent strength for the vindication of its political rights.

The All-India Committee passed this resolution late in the afternoon of August 8. In doing so, they took no account of the plain warning, given by Sir Stafford Cripps, that the "withdrawal of British rule" could not be made in the acute crisis of the war. They gave no sign of a desire to conciliate those whose co-operation was indispensable to the creation of a "National Government," especially the Moslems and the Depressed Classes. Nor did they seem to be aware that the foundation of such a Government did not exist, either in fact or in law. None the less, if India had not been at war, it is probable that the Government of India might have used the good offices of such men as Mr Rajagopalachari to find some *modus vivendi* which would obviate an open clash. But the circumstances were not those of peace, and the Government of India had evidence of a widespread movement which, if permitted to break loose, must gravely imperil the defence of the country. Balancing this risk against the risk involved in suppressing the movement at its source, the Government instantly decided which was the greater and arrested the leaders of the Congress Party on Sunday, August 9. This action was taken by a Government in which prominent Indians were in a majority of eleven to four; and though Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar resigned soon thereafter, he declared that he approved of it and had only left the Government because he felt that he could serve the cause of conciliation more effectively if his hands were free from the responsibilities of office.

The arrest of the Congress leaders provoked a violent protest. Riots broke out in Bombay, Delhi, and Madras; communications were interrupted; police stations sacked; and for some days violence was widespread. As August drew to a close, the Government of India could declare that the movement was not out of control, but the story of these events told by Sir Sultan Ahmed, the Law Member of the

Government in the Legislative Assembly on September 24,¹ showed that a serious situation still prevailed.

On the whole, the response to this assertion of official authority was not unfavourable. It was generally recognized that the action of the Government was a measure of security, distasteful and regrettable, but inevitable. Opinions differed on the question whether the arrest of the leaders had widened the gulf between Britain and India or not; but there was no difference of opinion on the fact that there was still a dangerous gulf to be bridged. And during the weeks that followed August 9 responsible comment in both countries revealed a growing conviction that the situation could not remain as it was. In Britain, the *Times* and the *Manchester Guardian* saw, even in the present crisis, a door to new opportunity; and, in India, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru (for the Indian Liberals), Mr Savarkar (for the Hindu Mahasabha), and Mr Rajagopalachari (for the less partisan Congressmen) sought in various ways to find common ground between the Nationalist position and the attitude of the Government of India.

IV. THE INDIAN STATES

"India" is defined by more than one statute as comprising not only the territory under the direct sovereignty under the Crown, but also the territories of the Indian States. But, in political fact and in treaty right, the Indian States have stood apart from British India and are often called "Indian India" to describe their condition under the rule of Princes of Indian blood, contrasted with the India of the British Raj. These States have played a large part in the history of the whole peninsula; they take so large a share in the life of India, both in peace and in war, and they stand in such a position of their own in relation to the Federal Union now under discussion that they claim separate consideration in these pages.

These Indian States are 562 in number. They range in magnitude from Hyderabad, whose Nizam is recognized as the premier Ruling Prince, with a territory three times the size of Ireland, to petty domains measuring a few square miles. Only 111 are reckoned as important enough to have separate representation of their own in the Chamber of Princes. Their rank in precedence within their own order is marked by the number of guns fired in salute for them, the five leading Princes—

(1) See *The Times*, Sept. 25, 1942.

Baroda, Gwalior, Hyderabad, Kashmir, and Mysore—having each a salute of twenty-one guns. The total territory occupied by the States is 712,000 square miles, against the British India area of one million; and their total population 92,000,000, the British Indian population being 296,000,000. Thus they comprise 39 per cent of the area and 23 per cent of the population of India. Few of them have any seaboard of their own. Being landlocked and practically surrounded by British India, their economic condition is considerably affected by the policy of the Government of India in respect of tariffs and communications. They vary greatly in resources and in industrial development, some of them being well abreast of modern requirements, and showing an example of social reform and education to the provinces of British India. The larger States have military forces of their own, usually trained and commanded by British officers; and units from these armies have fought in many wars side by side with the British battalions.

The map of India on page 75 shows their position and reveals the whole peninsula as a patchwork quilt, with British provinces and Indian States sewn together geographically in an irregular pattern. The pattern was woven by the hand of history long before the British Raj was created by Queen Victoria, and indeed long before Queen Elizabeth founded the East India Company on New Year's Eve 342 years ago. Throughout the ages successive conquerors found India as a whole too large to be administered from any one capital; and, having to their hand indigenous rulers to discharge the task, they left them in possession, but took care to exact recognition of themselves as the Sovereign Power, and to levy tribute from the subordinate rulers. Frequently the latter proved insubordinate, and thus the relationship between the sovereign conqueror and the lesser rulers of the Indian States varied so much that there could not be said to be any definite principle governing it. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the star of the Mogul Empire was setting, the satellite States grew more independent in fact, though still subordinate in constitutional theory. The anomalies which grew up in that period are well illustrated by the position of Sikander Jah, Nizam of Hyderabad, in 1803. This potentate was the ally, on terms of equality, of the British, by a treaty which recognized his sovereignty. Yet, before he could feel that his right to the throne of Hyderabad was secure he had to gain recognition from the King of Delhi who, in his turn, was virtually the prisoner, and actually the pensioner of the British.

It took something like half-a-century to establish the true relation

between the Paramount Power and the States. It is not surprising that there should have been much controversy regarding their status and many conflicting interpretations of the doctrine of "paramountcy." But, in broad outline, and in actual policy, both in respect of the rights of the States, and the limitations upon them, the present position is pretty clear. At Bahawalpur in 1903, Lord Curzon, speaking as Viceroy, said: "The ties between the Indian Princes and the British Crown have no parallel in any other country of the world. The political system of India is neither feudalism nor federation; it is embodied in no constitution; it does not always rest upon a treaty; it bears no resemblance to a league. It represents a series of relationships that have grown up between the Crown and the Indian Princes under widely differing historical conditions, but which in process of time have gradually conformed to a single type."

The territory of these States is not British territory. Their subjects are not British subjects. "The sovereignty over them," says the late Sir Courtenay Ilbert, "is divided between the British Government and the ruler of the Native State in proportions which differ greatly according to the history and importance of the several States, and which are regulated partly by treaties or less formal engagements, partly by sanads or charters, and partly by usage. The maximum of sovereignty enjoyed by any of their rulers is represented by a prince like the Nizam of Hyderabad, who coins money, taxes his subjects, and inflicts capital punishment without appeal. The minimum of sovereignty is represented by the lord of a few acres in Kathiawar, who enjoys immunity from British taxation, and exercises some shadow of judicial authority."

In the case of every Indian State the British Government, as the paramount Power, have a general power:—

- (1) of exclusive control over the foreign relations of the State;
- (2) of general, but limited, responsibility for the internal peace of the State;
- (3) with a special responsibility for the safety and welfare of British subjects resident in the State; and
- (4) to require subordinate co-operation in the task of resisting foreign aggression and maintaining internal order.

It follows from the exclusive control exercised by the British Government over the foreign relations of Native States that an Indian State has no international existence. It does not, as a separate unit, form a member of the family of nations. It cannot make war. It cannot enter into any treaty, engagement, or arrangement with any of its neighbours.

If, for instance, it wishes to settle a question of disputed frontier, it does so, not by means of an agreement, but by means of rules or orders framed by an officer of the British Government on the application of the parties in the dispute. In the case of the famous dispute between the Sikh States of Patiala and Nabha the Viceroy was the arbiter, and finally closed the protracted case by deposing the Maharaja of Nabha.

It is sometimes said that there is irony in the fact that a democratic Power like Britain should assist in maintaining Indian autocrats on their thrones. So bald a statement takes no account of the nature of these so-called autocracies, and little either of the limitations imposed on absolute rule, or of the relations that exist between most Indian rulers and their subjects. In many Indian minds these States are the true upholders of Indian traditions; and, if it be said that the past from which this tradition sprang is now giving place to a very different future, the salient fact is that historic or traditional India is not yet in full retreat before the forces of modern times. And some of the shrewdest observers of Indian life have been wont to say that the real struggle in India lies not so much between the British Raj and Indian Nationalism as between the Old India and the New. Be that as it may, and whatever the outcome, the Indian States are a recognized factor in Indian politics, they take their stand on their existing rights in relation to the new programme of Federal Union; but in taking that position, so far from standing aloof or using their treaty rights to obstruct the general progress, they proved at the Round Table Conference of 1932 that they were prepared to move with the times. Indeed, their decision to accept a place in Federal India was the most striking feature of the Conference, and did more to bring the proposed Union into the field of practical politics than any other single factor in those memorable proceedings. By this decision they moved nearer the orbit of British India than ever before. And in order to see how far both the British Raj and the State had moved from their respective positions in the nineteenth century we may look back for a moment at the history of their relations since Queen Victoria became Empress of India.

The chief result of the Indian Mutiny (1857) was to bring to an end the political career of the East India Company, and to place the modern British Raj, in the form of the Government of India, in its stead. The new government took over, among other things, the whole body of strangely assorted treaties which the Company had made with the Indian States. The Company had regarded many of the leading States as convenient allies, but none the less, as allies that "wanted watching." The trend of Company policy had been both to deprive the States of

any military power they might have possessed, and to prevent one State from keeping close contact with any other. A certain watchful distrust pervaded the scene. But the Mutiny itself ushered in a change of mind. One of the principal causes of the Sepoy Revolt lay in the condition of unrest in many Indian States engendered by the short-sighted policy of the Company during the previous half-century. Already, four years before the Mutiny, *The Times* had said: "... we give these Princes power without responsibility ... the result is in most of the States, a chronic anarchy," which was revealed in all its nakedness by the outbreak of 1857. *The Times* probably went too far in saying "most of the States"; and it is certain that, however deep the trouble had bitten in some of them, many of them faced the storm itself in such a way as to turn the scales of that critical campaign against the mutineers. This was all the more remarkable because the Company had never shown much tenderness for States themselves. They had indeed frankly avowed their own purpose of annexation, when and where possible, in 1841; and the most striking result of the Mutiny was the reversal of this policy by the Crown when the Queen declared in her Proclamation of 1858 that "we desire no extension of our present territorial possessions, and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, the dignity and honour of Native Princes as our own; and we desire that they, as well as their own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government."

The Queen's words sounded like an assurance that, "in respecting the rights of Princes," and in abjuring annexation, the world in which the rulers lived would go on much as before. But, as the next fifty years were to show, the Queen had in fact opened a new era in which, to quote the Royal words once more, "the internal peace and good government" of the States became the criterion by which they would be judged. In a word, the Mutiny brought the States and the British Crown into a new and more responsible (or responsive) relationship, and the assumption of direct sovereignty by the Crown changed the whole historical and constitutional position of the Indian rulers. From the foreign and independent allies of a sovereign corporation the great States found themselves transformed into protected "feudatories" of the Crown of England, whose sovereignty over them was boldly and frankly announced. Lord Canning himself declared in 1862 that "the Crown of England stood forward the unquestioned ruler and paramount power

in *all* India, and was for the first time brought face to face with the feudatories, and that there was a reality in the suzerainty of the Sovereign of England which never existed before, and which was eagerly acknowledged by the Chiefs."

The logical implications of this change had a far-reaching influence upon the development of Indian polity. The British Government definitely and deliberately laid it down as a principle for their own conduct that annexation of territories as a solution either of the problem of misgovernment, disloyalty of the ruler, or for strategic considerations, should be ruled out. As a consequence there developed a new policy, based on the moral responsibility of the British Government for a minimum of good government, security, law and order, within the territories of the Indian States. Speaking to an assemblage of Rajput princes, Lord Mayo (Viceroy, 1869-72) thus expressed the general principles that the Government of India had adopted to guide their own political conduct. "If we support you in your power, we expect in return good government. We demand that everywhere through the length and breadth of Rajputana, justice and order shall prevail; that every man's property shall be secure; that the traveller shall come and go in safety; that the cultivator shall enjoy the fruits of his labour, and the trader the produce of his commerce; that you shall make roads and undertake the construction of those works of irrigation which will improve the condition of the people and swell the revenues of your states; that you shall encourage education and provide for the relief of the sick."

From Canning, the first post-Mutiny Viceroy, to Chelmsford, in whose Viceroyalty the Chamber of Princes came into being, the words of Lord Mayo remained true. The manner in which they were interpreted may have varied from time to time, but the substance has stood unchanged. On the eve of his departure from India, Lord Reading declared it anew in a message to the premier Prince, the Nizam of Hyderabad, dated March 22, 1926:—

"The sovereignty of the Crown is supreme in India... its supremacy is not based only upon treaties and engagements, but exists independently of them, and quite apart from its prerogative in matters relating to foreign power and policies, it is the right and duty of the British Government, while scrupulously respecting all treaties and engagements, to preserve peace and good order throughout India. The consequences that follow are so well known and so clearly apply no less to your Exalted Highness than to other rulers that it seems hardly necessary to point them out. But, if illustrations are necessary, I would remind your Exalted Highness that the Ruler

of Hyderabad, along with other rulers, received in 1862 a sanad declaratory of the British Government's desire for the perpetuation of his house and government subject to continued loyalty to the Crown; that no succession to the musnad of Hyderabad is valid unless it is recognized by H.M. the King Emperor; and that the British Government is the only arbiter in case of disputed succession.

"The right of the British Government to intervene in internal affairs of Indian States is another instance of the consequences necessarily involved in the supremacy of the British Crown . . . Where Imperial interests are concerned or the general welfare of the people of a state is seriously and grievously affected by the action of its government, it is with the paramount power that the ultimate necessity for taking remedial action, if necessary, must lie."

Now, it cannot be doubted that, in the years following the Mutiny, the Princes welcomed the substitution of the Royal House of Britain for the East India Company as the British signatory on their treaties. There was, for them, a new prestige in the compact arising from the fact that the Crown was itself the fountain of honour which even so powerful a corporation as the Company could never be. None the less, the implications of the change provoked frequent resistance from the Princes; and the steady growth of the Paramount Power often seemed to reduce their relative status. The Mahratta Dynasty had never attempted to assert such an overriding authority; and, though the Moguls may have conceived of an Indian polity somewhat like it, they never in fact established their power in such complete "paramountcy." But British paramountcy has not been inspired merely by a desire to increase the power or prestige of the Government of India for reasons of prestige alone. It has been created by the operation of modern economic forces, combined with the growth of modern conceptions of social reform. When Lord Chelmsford told the Chamber of Princes in 1921 that "the growth of new conditions had altered political doctrines"; when he pointed to railways, telegraphs, coinage, currency, opium policy, industrial development, etc., as the economic reasons why "the relations between the States and the Imperial Government had changed"; when he declared that "the change had come about in the interests of India as a whole," he was stating a case which some of the Princes knew already. He was describing the operation of economic forces which were destined to play a large part in bringing them to the decisions made at the Round Table Conference eleven years later. In the eyes of the more far-sighted Indian Princes the economic effect of British Indian policy on their own States was too far-reaching to be left in the hands of an authority in whose deliberations they had no

direct part. Being within the economic orbit of India as a whole, they were drawn into the political orbit by their own needs. Hence their decision to become partners in the new Federation.

The association between British India and the Indian India has become more and more akin to a federal relation with each development of constitutional progress in British India itself. The striking feature in the complex system of the relations between Indian States and the Government is that they form one definite Indian polity—the Indian Empire. Internationally, and even before the conception of Federation offered a prospect of organic internal union, British India, together with the States, formed one unity. Even as regards the British Empire, India, both British as well as Indian, is a single entity. The disabilities which Indian subjects suffer in the colonies extend to the subjects of the Princes. The rights which Indian subjects possess elsewhere are enjoyed by the subjects of the Princes. The States form part of the political system. There are already evident, both in the system, and in the relationship which is the basis of it, important elements of a federal tie. The whole theory of federalism is that while the constituents remain masters of their own immediate affairs, the claims of the Central Government are recognized in a definite surrender of important rights. That is the essence of the Indian system, so far as it relates to the major States. The joint political entity of the States and British India is recognized, and the Government of India as the Central Government exercises certain rights which the States have surrendered. The tie is thus quasi-federal, and is based on a division of sovereignty. It is not a confederation, because the right to secede does not exist, and the Central Government has become the only authority responsible for defence and high policy. The federalism of Indian polity has, up till now, been limited and incomplete, inasmuch as the Central Government has practically no legislative, executive, or fiscal authority over the States. It is true that the jurisdiction of European and American residents is reserved for it, and that the Central Government through its own executive officers controls the telegraph and postal systems, which operate even within the limits of the States. But that can be considered only as a part of the action taken for defence. The Central Government, vested in the Governor-General in Council, has no powers of legislation which can, without the express enactment of the rulers, affect the subjects of States. But the course marked out by destiny was already clear before the words "Federal Union" were actually pronounced in 1931 at the Round Table Conference. Nearly twenty years ago the Maharajah of Alwar declared, "My goal is the *United States of India*, where every

province, every state working out its own destiny, in accordance with its own environment, its tradition, history, and religion, will combine together for higher and imperial purposes, each subscribing its little quota of knowledge and experience in a labour of love freely given for a noble and higher cause."

The pathway to this achievement has proved more difficult than it may have seemed to be in the moment of enthusiasm aroused by the general acceptance of the federal ideal in London eleven years ago. The obstacles are not yet overcome; and the States may have good reason to hang back until the parties of British India compose their differences. But, just as no British Government will ever seek to turn back the hands of the clock or to relinquish the purpose of the Draft Declaration of 1942, so, in their turn, the Indian States are committed to the cause of the United States of India in a Federal Union.

V. INDIA IN THE WAR

India is at war with the King's enemies when the King is at war. There can be no doubt about the constitutional position here; but, as we have seen, this legal power to declare India at war was a cause of offence to the Congress leaders, who maintained that India "was dragged into the war" without political consultation with those who claimed to be the true mouthpiece of Indian opinion. Had the Congress Party's attitude been general, in any authentic popular sense, the response of India to the Nazi challenge would not have been what it was. The impressive record of Indian service in the field, supported by great industrial activity in war production, shows that India was a genuine belligerent, both in spiritual hostility to the Axis and in action on many fronts. We have already endeavoured to give an objective appreciation of the political psychology prevailing in September 1939, and of its effect on the relations between the Government of India and the Congress movement. We saw that there was cause to regret that the Government of India failed to appreciate the necessity to associate *all* elements in Indian life with themselves in the act of going to war. Shrewder, more realistic, and more sympathetic action by the Government would have opened the way to co-operation with the Opposition, and might have avoided many subsequent difficulties. To express this opinion may seem to usurp the judgement of history; but it is almost certain that the apparent failure of the Cripps' Mission of 1942 was due,

in some measure, to this initial official error, and not to any flaw in the Declaration of the War Cabinet or to any fault in the missionary himself. Chapter III has already dealt with this problem, and we now pass to the story of India at war in order to complete this bird's-eye view.

India stands mid-way between the Western and Far Eastern theatres of war. Strictly speaking, she belongs to neither, but is a link between them both, occupying a position between them which is now recognized as vital. Her situation has radically changed in the past twenty years, both by the development of air power and by Japan's success. During the nineteenth century the chief theatre of Indian defence was her own North-West Frontier. Sea-power guaranteed maritime security; and the main, if not the only, concern of land strategy was the maintenance of a powerful bastion against the threat of a Russian advance through Persia. Thus the whole design of the past turned on one pivot, the mountain barrier of the north-west. To-day the design is drawn more widely. India is being defended on two sides: on the Burma frontier in the east against the unforeseen threat of Japanese aggression, and in Egypt to the west. India's security was assured in the Napoleonic wars by Nelson's victory of the Nile; and her security in like manner turns to-day on the fate of a campaign in Egypt once more.

At the outbreak of war the fighting forces of India were comprised in the Indian Army, the Indian State Forces, the Indian Air Force, and the Royal Indian Navy. The Army in India then consisted of regular British troops (57,000), regular Indian troops (157,000), the Auxiliary Force (24,000), the Territorial Force (19,000), the Indian Army Reserve (35,400), and the Indian State Forces (40,000). There were thus 332,000 men capable of mobilization, including the Indian State Forces, which were voluntarily placed at the disposal of the Government of India. Normally, each Indian brigade consists of one British unit and two Indian units, three battalions to a brigade. In June 1940 100,000 new recruits were called; and between 1939 and 1942 altogether 700,000 men were added to the combatant forces; thus bringing India's man-power under arms to a grand total of over one million in 1942. It is manifest that a force of this magnitude could not have been raised, trained, equipped, and 300,000 of them dispatched for service on widely separated fronts if the body of the civil population from which it was drawn had been opposed, *in any vital sense*, to the Government which it served. There have been cases and occasions in which civil disturbance at home has impaired the disciplined efficiency of the Indian Army, but such incidents have been exceptions to the general rule, and only serve to throw into higher relief the genuine brotherhood in arms

which has been the guiding spirit of the Army in India, both British and Indian. If this spirit had not prevailed throughout the long and glorious history of the Indian Army, the British Raj would not be able to claim that it has enlisted, in a common British-Indian purpose, the martial ardour of many Indian communities. It is sometimes maintained that this martial spirit finds expression in only limited sections of the Indian population, that it is confined geographically to the north and the north-west. It is further suggested that the forces of the Indian States have performed military services which give them a special recognition in war. Both of these claims can be established by the past record of the so-called martial classes and of the performance of the Indian States in modern warfare. But it would be an entire mistake to suppose that the warlike action of India is confined to the martial classes of the north and to the forces of the Indian States. The Indian Army is composed of many other elements, among which Bombay, Madras, and Central India contribute units which have military records as impressive as any of the so-called martial races of the north. Therefore, the Indian Army of to-day is just as much an expression of national purpose as any political organ. And those who ignore this vital fact do not take full account of the whole problem. The Indian Nationalist who fails to realize the part that these martial classes have played, and will play, in India's future is not facing the facts of India to-day and to-morrow.

At sea, the main responsibility for defence rests on the Royal Navy; and this service is provided by the British taxpayer. The Indian naval forces proper belong to the Royal Indian Navy (formerly the Royal Indian Marine), which was reorganized in 1928 on its present combatant basis under a Flag Officer of the Royal Navy. It flies the White Ensign—a much-prized honour—and consisted, at the outbreak of war, of nineteen small ships, mostly of a coast-defence and escort type. Since 1939 many new ships have been built in Indian yards. The Royal Indian Navy is an acknowledged factor in the present and future defence of India. It is not in itself as vital to Indian security as the land forces; but it has proved its place in Indian strategy more than once since the war began.

Up to the outbreak of war officers of the Indian Air Force, as of the Royal Indian Navy, were trained in England. With the outbreak of the war, recruitment on a regular basis, both for flying and ground staff, was abolished and replaced by recruitment to the Indian Air Force Volunteer Reserve on a war basis. Immediate steps had also to be taken to establish training schools in India for all branches of the service. To

begin with training was carried out at the Air Force Training School, Risalpur, both for Europeans and Indians. Later, schools for the India Air Force were established at Lahore, Ambala, Begumpet (Hyderabad, Deccan), and Jodhpur. There is also an important civil aviation training scheme, designed initially to turn out 300 pilots and 2,000 ground staff per annum for two years.

But an air force does not consist entirely, or even mainly, of pilots and observers. Both expansion and operation are entirely dependent on adequate supplies of highly-trained ground staff. For each pilot in the air a considerable number of men are needed on the ground to maintain his aircraft and armament in perfect condition. These ground staff are trained at the Technical Training School, Ambala, also established since the outbreak of war, which turns out all the tradesmen and technicians required—fitters, riggers, electricians, wireless operators, mechanics, and so forth. These men first undergo preparatory civil training under the technical training scheme of the Director of Civil Aviation; then follow at Ambala courses of varying lengths, according to the trade concerned, after which they are posted to operational squadrons.

Units of the Indian Air Force operated in Burma. They were congratulated by General Wavell for their successful bombing and reconnaissance raids. This force was entirely manned by Indians. On one raid an Indian pilot officer led a force of R.A.F. and Indian Air Force bombers which bombed targets from as low as 500 feet. Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, Air Officer Commanding in India, also referred appreciatively to the work of the force in Burma, and added: "I feel confident that their achievements there are a forerunner of what one may expect from the Indian Air Force when its remaining squadrons take their places in the air." These squadrons are being re-equipped with modern aircraft, both fighter and bomber, from the reinforcements that are coming to India. Every day Indian pilots make reconnaissance flights over Indian waters.

All these forces are supported by an industrial base provided by the economic development of India. It is true that the heavy equipment of war is mostly supplied from abroad; but a great advance towards self-sufficiency has been made.

Indian industry is a modern growth. It is only in the comparatively recent past that industrial and economic problems have claimed any attention in the public life of India. Neither the East India Company, nor the British Government, nor the leaders of India themselves, took cognizance of anything but political or administrative questions in

earlier times. Commerce, not industry, was the chief economic activity. The first move in the direction of heavy industry followed naturally in the wake of the railways, and when these new means of communication had ushered in a new era of commerce and manufacture they also opened the way to more far-reaching developments in iron and steel. The period preceding the Great War was a period of general prosperity, industrial advance, and trade expansion. By 1913 the cotton, jute, coal, engineering, and plantation industries had become strong and progressive. Cotton yarn and piece-goods, jute cloth and gunnies came to rank among India's chief exports. In 1907 the famous Tata Iron and Steel Company was founded, producing pig-iron at once, and steel seven years later. The Tata hydro-electric concerns were started, and began to supply electricity to Bombay mills in 1915, whilst the Burma oil-fields (whose development started in 1891) supplied the Indian Peninsula with a new source of illumination and power.

The Great War of 1914-18 acted as a stimulus to industrialization. Indian trade suffered at first, but the demand for supplies and equipment for the Army, especially in the Mesopotamian campaign, soon gave a powerful impetus to industrial expansion. During the war the cotton and jute industries worked to fullest capacity, and the Tata Iron and Steel Company raised their production of finished steel from 19,000 tons in 1913 to 124,000 tons in 1918-19. The war revealed both the potentialities and deficiencies of Indian industries. The post-war years brought even more notable features into the picture. In 1919 India gained "Fiscal Autonomy," and the Indian Fiscal Commission recommended in 1922 a policy of "discriminating protection." The general tariff was raised, and in 1924 the iron and steel industry was granted protection by 33 1/3 per cent import duty, plus a system of government subsidies, which were retained until 1927. From 1927 onwards protection was partly qualified by Imperial preference, by the Ottawa Agreements of 1932, and by the subsequent Indo-British Trade Agreements of 1935 and 1939.

Thus by the time war broke out again in 1939 India had strengthened her own economy and had at least partially equipped herself with industrial power to meet the new demand. For instance, the Tata Iron and Steel Company trebled their output of pig-iron, quadrupled their output of steel ingots, and more than trebled their production of finished steel. To the immediate purpose of the war industrial India could thus make a substantial contribution. Though her heavy industry could not supply anything like the whole demand of mechanical warfare, the new factories did in fact furnish a large part of her own immediate

war needs. The consequent call for increased deliveries of iron and steel has led to development in productive capacity which will give India a new place in the ferrous metal trade of the Middle and Far East after the war. But, in order to place the new growth of Indian industry in its true relation to this bird's-eye view of India, we must here take particular note of its effect on the whole Indian economy.

In the twenty-five years that lie between the outbreak of the two world wars the number of factories rose from under 3,000 to close on 10,000, of which 1,700 are classed as "large industrial establishments." The urban population rose between 1911 and 1931 by seven millions, and the census of 1941 is expected to show a continuing increase. Even so, the predominantly rural character of India is shown by the fact that this substantial growth only raised the urban percentage of the total population from 9 to 11 per cent. In roughly the same period coal production rose from 16,000,000 tons to 19,000,000 tons; sugar from 5,000,000 cwt. to 19,000,000 cwt.; cotton manufactures from 256,000,000 lb. to close on a billion; while so substantial a number of new goods came into production that in 1942 out of 60,000 *different articles required in modern war India now manufactures over 45,000*. It is impossible in this brief space to give a full account of this remarkable expansion; but certain outstanding results must be given. Between 1939 and 1942 the number of uniforms and other military clothing rose from 75,000 to over 7,000,000; sandbags rose by billions; boots to 3,000,000 pairs a year; various new items of munition supply from a few score to 700; gun-production eight-fold, and filled shells a hundred-fold. The first Indian-built aircraft was test-flown in August 1941 at the Hindustan Aircraft Factory, in which a Curtiss fighter of the Hawk type is now under production. And it is estimated that the number of armoured fighting vehicles produced in 1942 will exceed 3,000. Finally, in addition to supplying textiles, foodstuffs, rolling-stock, timber, and coal to the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, East and South Africa, the Middle East, and Singapore, India has supplied the United Nations with over 600,000 filled shells and 150 million rounds of small arm ammunition.

The war has also had a notable effect on India's position as a debtor. In 1942-43 alone Britain will have paid India £300,000,000 for war services of many kinds; and it seems likely that by April 1943 the Government of India *will have paid off their entire public debt in sterling*. In 1936 British investors held the public debt of India (in various forms) to the amount of £376,250,000. By the end of the financial year

1941-42 this sum had been reduced to £90,000,000, and will soon be reduced to zero. The effect of this feat of transfer becomes clear when we remember that the bulk of British investment in past loans issued by the Government of India supplied funds for the development of railways, irrigation, and other public works which India will now own, free from the encumbrance of interest paid to an external bondholder. Railways provide the most striking illustration. The Government of India invested about £600,000,000 in State-owned railways, and obtained a very large part of the total from the British investor. As the result of two wars this immense asset will pass almost entirely from British to Indian hands. Indian railways, which used to be managed (and, in small part owned) by London companies, are now passing entirely under Indian control; and for the most part India is now the owner of her own railways, financing, equipping, and managing practically the whole system.

This represents a transfer of ownership of assets created in the past; but in respect of the contemporary development of privately owned industry the same phenomenon has to be recorded. Formerly, jute, tea, coal, and shipping were almost exclusively developed by British enterprise; cotton in Bombay mainly by Indian capital. To-day, cotton, iron, steel, sugar, cement, and many other industries are financed by Indian capital; and even in the older enterprises of jute and coal Indian capital is steadily replacing British capital, even where British management still continues. There has been less co-operation in shipping and there is still a competitive conflict between British and Indian shipping interests, especially in coast-wise traffic and the maritime service of the Indian ocean. But the general tendency has been towards co-operation between British firms and Indian investors, on the basis of rupee investment, in which (unlike the political field) racial differences are forgotten in the pursuit of common economic aims.

Taking the widest view of this economic growth, from the opening of the first Indian railway in 1853 to the moment when the Eastern Supply Conference met in Delhi in 1941 to organize war production for the whole Eastern front, we can see that something little short of an economic revolution had been wrought. Not only had railways and irrigation practically abolished famine, not only had new resources of national wealth been tapped and exploited and a new class of skilled workers been created, but a new standard of life had been set up. Its effect took long to reach the lowest levels especially in the countryside, and many parts still remain almost untouched. But the former stagnation no longer prevailed and a movement upwards began. Despite the

severe setback of the Economic Depression ten years ago, the principal gains have been maintained, and to them the demands of the war have now added a substantial increase of national income. Thus India's chief weakness, her widespread poverty, is being remedied, in respect of certain areas and certain sections of her population. The improvement wrought is still unequally distributed; and it will be one of the main obligations of the legislatures under the new Constitution to see that the benefits of economic progress reach those who most need them; namely, the peasant cultivators who are still the mainstay of India's economic life.

The effect of this secular process was shown in the decision to make India a clearing-house of Eastern war production. When the Eastern Supply Conference met in Delhi in 1940 India was already in the position of one of the first eight industrial producers of the world, and therefore it was not only for geographical reasons that the Conference met on Indian soil. It was obvious that Indian production must furnish an increasing part in the whole supply of the Allied war effort east of Suez. This gave India a special place in the general picture of the war; and thus the encouragement given twenty years ago to the indigenous growth of Indian industry is now earning an impressive reward.

In broad summary it may be said that the war has given the development of India a new impulse. In certain aspects, and especially in politics, the full extent of this new growth is concealed by the smoke-screen of controversy; but, whether the attention of the observer is directed to economic enterprise, to the general welfare, or to political status, the course on which India is now set is clear. When the war is over the people of India will possess economic assets more fully developed than ever before; and this improvement in the material conditions of Indian life should provide the country with a mainstay in the difficult economic situation which is bound to arise everywhere after the war. Moreover, nothing but an Axis victory can rob them of the right, through their own representatives, to fashion the new Indian Government and freely to choose the place which the country shall hold in the world. This is the plain meaning of the Cripps Declaration; and it is also the pledged intention of the Government and people of Britain.

APPENDIX I

TABLE OF PARALLEL DATES

GENERAL HISTORY	INDIA
1497-8 Voyage of Vasco da Gama to India.	1556-1605 Akbar.
1558-1603 Elizabeth.	1565 Fall of Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar.
1577-80 Drake's voyage round the world.	1600 East India Company founded.
	1602 Dutch East India Company founded.
1603 James I.	1604 French East India Company founded.
1606 First Charter of Virginia Company.	
1625 Charles I.	
1628 Charter granted to Massachusetts Company.	1634 English permitted to trade throughout the dominions of the Mogul.
	1639 Madras bought by East India Company.
	Fort St George built.
	1640 East India Company's factory at Hugli.
1642-9 Civil War in England.	
1649 Commonwealth.	
1652 Dutch East India Company established at the Cape.	
1653 Oliver Cromwell, Protector.	1657 Cromwell's charter to East India Company.
1660 Charles II.	1661 English get Bombay as part of dowry of Catherine of Braganza.
1664 New York taken from the Dutch.	(April) Charles II grants charter to East India Company.
	1677 Charter granting Company powers of coinage.
1685 James II.	1686 Calcutta founded.
	Charter of James II to East India Company.
1688 Revolution in England.	
1689 William III.	
1689-97 War between England and France.	1696 East India Company build Fort William.
1702-13 War of Spanish Succession.	1739 Invasion of India by Nadir Sháh.

1740-86 Frederick the Great of Prussia.

1756-61 The elder Pitt, Earl of Chatham, directs foreign policy in England.

1759 Wolfe takes Quebec.

1760 George III.

1763 Peace of Paris—end of Seven Years' War.

1768-71 Captain Cook circumnavigates the world.

1776 Declaration of Independence of United States.

1778 War with France in Europe.

1781 England at war with Spain, France, Holland, and American colonies.

1783 (Jan.) Treaty of Versailles—Peace signed between England and United States.

1783-1801 William Pitt, Prime Minister

1788-95 Trial of Warren Hastings.

1789 French Revolution.

1808-14 Peninsular War.

1812 Napoleon invades Russia.

1813 (June) Battle of Vittoria. (Oct.) Battle of Leipzig.

1814 First Peace of Paris. Napoleon abdicates. Cape ceded to England.

1830 William IV.

Lord Grey, Prime Minister.

1750-4 War between French and English Companies.

1756 Suráj-ud-dowlá becomes Nawab of Bengal and (June) takes Calcutta. (Black Hole Massacre.)

1757 Battle of Plassey.

1765 Clive accepts control of Bengal Government for the Company, makes treaties of alliance with Oudh and the Mogul emperor.

1771 Company in full control of Bengal.

1772 Warren Hastings, Governor of Bengal, draws up plan of government.

Directors of East India Company declare a deficit, and appeal to Lord North for help. Secret parliamentary inquiry into affairs of Company.

1774 Warren Hastings becomes first Governor-General of India.

1783-4 Fox's India Bill introduced and rejected.

1784 Pitt's Act establishing Board of Control (24 Geo. III, sess. 2, c. 25).

1786-93 Lord Cornwallis, Governor-General.

1793 "Permanent Settlement" of Bengal.

1813 Charter Act (55 Geo. III, c. 155).

1832 Reform Bill passed.

1853-6 Crimean War.

1855 Lord Palmerston, Prime Minister.

1856 Treaty of Paris.

1859 Austro-Italian War. Battles of Magenta and Solferino.

Lord Palmerston, Prime Minister.

1874 Disraeli, Prime Minister.

1880 Gladstone, Prime Minister.

1882 Indian troops used in the Egyptian War.

1885 Lord Salisbury, Prime Minister.

1892 Gladstone, Prime Minister.

1904 Russo-Japanese War.

1905 Anglo-Japanese Treaty signed.

1907 Colonial Conference at the Colonial Office (first meeting).

1833 Charter Act (3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 85) terminates trading functions of East India Company and defines legislative powers of Governor-General in Council. Macaulay appointed legislative member of Governor-General's Council.

1856 Oudh annexed.

1856-62 Lord Canning, Governor-General.

1857-8 Indian Mutiny. Outbreaks at Meerut and Delhi (June). Delhi taken (Sept.). First relief of Lucknow by Havelock and Outram (Sept.). Final relief of Lucknow by Sir Colin Campbell (Nov.).

1858 Government of India Act (21 & 22 Vict. c. 106), places British India under direct government of Crown.

Lord Canning, Viceroy.

Queen's Amnesty Proclamation published in India.

1862 Indian Civil Service Act (24 & 25 Vict. c. 54) and Indian High Courts Act (24 & 25 Vic. c. 104) and Indian Councils Act (24 & 25 Vict. c. 67), passed by Parliament.

Code of Criminal Procedure passed in India.

1877 Queen proclaimed Empress of India at Delhi.

1884 Indian National Congress founded.

1892 Constitution and procedure of Indian Legislative Councils altered by Indian Councils Act (55 & 56 Vict. c. 14).

1904 Indian Universities Act.

1905-6 Visit of the Prince and Princess of Wales to India.

1907 Agreement with the Chinese Government for the gradual extinction of the export of Indian opium to China.

- 1908 Asquith, Prime Minister.
- 1909 Indian Councils Act passed; legislative councils greatly enlarged and their functions extended; system of direct election of members introduced, and non-official majorities established in provincial councils.
- 1911 George V crowned.
Revolution in China.
- 1911-12 Visit of the King-Emperor and Queen-Empress to India (Durbar and Delhi, Dec. 1911).
- 1912 Transfer of the seat of the Government of India from Calcutta to Delhi.
- 1914 (Aug.) War with Germany.
(Dec.) Egypt declared a British Protectorate.
- 1914 Dispatch of Indian troops to join the British Expeditionary Forces.
- 1916 Lord Chelmsford, Viceroy.
- 1917 U.S.A. enters war.
- 1917 Mr E. S. Montagu, Secretary of State, visited India.
- 1918 Armistice signed.
- 1918 Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.
- 1919 Peace Treaty signed.
- 1919 Unrest in India: Amritsar riots, etc.
Government of India Act: Central Legislative with two Chambers, provincial legislative Councils, 70% of whose members popularly elected. Provincial self-government, e.g., beginning of dyarchy.
- 1920 First elections of Provincial Councils Legislative Assembly and Councils of State held. Boycotted by Swaraj Party.
- 1921 Opening of Indian Legislative Assembly, Chamber of Princes, and Provincial Legislative Councils in Madras, Bengal, and Bombay.
- 1922 Treaty of Lausanne with Turkey.
- 1922 Swaraj Party, under leadership of Pandit Motilal Nehru and Mr. C. R. Das, took part in elections to second Legislatures, securing 45 seats in the Assembly.
- 1924 First Labour Government in Great Britain.
- 1924 Sir Alexander Muddiman's Commission of Inquiry on the working of the Act.
- 1925 Treaty of Locarno.
- 1926 General Strike in Great Britain.
- 1926 The Congress Party "walked out" of the Legislative Assembly.
Lord Irwin, Viceroy.
- 1927 Statutory Commission set up under chairmanship of Sir John Simon.
- 1928 Mr Gandhi returned to the leadership of the Congress Party.

1929-31 Onset of world-wide Economic Depression.

1929 Report of States Inquiry Committee (Butler Committee) on relations between Paramount Power and States; financial and economic relations between British India and States.

Indian All-Parties Congress adopted report of Committee set up to determine principles of a Constitution for India on the same basis and status as the other Dominions. (Oct.) Declaration by Government of India that Dominion status was natural issue of Indian constitutional progress.

1930 Civil Disobedience campaign launched by Congress.

Report of the Statutory Commission (Simon Report) recommending new Federal Constitution. Dyarchy abolished and to be replaced by unitary Cabinet responsible to Legislature; Governor to have full powers in event of a breakdown; franchise to be widened with special provision for minorities; representation according to population in Federal Assembly; defence an Imperial responsibility; Council of Greater India to determine matters of common concern between British India and the States.

(Nov.) Opening of India Round Table Conference in London.

1931 Coalition Government in Great Britain under MacDonald and Baldwin.
Japan invades Manchuria.

1931 Declaration of Policy by His Majesty's Government accepted principle of responsible federal government. Central Government to be federation of all India, including Indian States and British India in bicameral legislature. Executive responsible to Legislature. Defence and external affairs reserved for Governor-General.

(March) Communal riots at Cawnpore. Irwin-Gandhi pact signed. Civil Disobedience Movement abandoned in return for release of political prisoners.

(April) Lord Willingdon, Viceroy.

- 1931 Second Round Table Conference in London. Mr Gandhi sole representative of the Congress Party.
- (Dec.) Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government summarizing measure of agreement reached at Conference and proposals for solution of Communal deadlock.
- 1932 Report of Franchise Committee (Lothian Committee) taken into consideration by His Majesty's Government in Communal Award—allocated seats, General, Moslem, Depressed Classes, with provision for Women, Labour, Commerce, Industry, Landholders, Universities.
- Poona Pact between Mr Gandhi and Dr Ambedkar modified the Communal Award *re* Depressed Classes accepted by His Majesty's Government.
- 1933 Hitler comes to power.
- 1933 Proposals for Indian Constitutional Reform issued by His Majesty's Government examined by joint select Committee of Parliament aided by 28 Indian assessors.
- 1934 Death of Hindenburg; Hitler becomes Führer.
- 1935 (Aug.) Government of India Act passed creating Federal Union. Federal Executive consisting of Governor-General and Council responsible to Legislature, with defence, foreign affairs and ecclesiastical affairs reserved for Governor-General. Bicameral legislature with provision for minorities. Eleven Provinces of British India to be administered by Governor and Council responsible to Legislature. Indian States to enter Federation if and when they desire. Federation to be set up when one half of Princes had joined. Burma to be given separate constitution.
- 1935 Italo-Abyssinian War.
- 1936 Germany occupies Rhineland.
- 1938 Germany invades Austria. Chamberlain flies to Munich. (Sept.) Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia occupied by German troops.
- 1939 (March) Germany invades Czechoslovakia.
- 1939 (Sept.) India automatically at war with Germany. Ordinances issued giving wide powers to Executive over Provincial Governments.
- (Sept.) Great Britain declares war on Germany.
- Congress Working Party protest against India being declared a belligerent without her consent.

- 1940 (April) German invasion of Denmark and Norway.
 (May) German invasion of Low Countries.
 (June) French sign Armistice with Germany.
 Italy declares war on Great Britain.
 (Aug.) Battle of Britain begins.
 (Oct.) Italy declares war on Greece.
- 1941 (Jan.) British take Tobruk.
 (March) Battle of Matapan.
 Signature of Lease-Lend Bill.
 (April) Germans invade Greece and Yugoslavia.
 (May) British evacuate Greece.
 (May) Revolt in Iraq.
 (June) British evacuate Crete.
 (June) Germany invades Russia.
 (Aug.) Atlantic Charter.
 (Dec.) Japanese attack Pearl Harbour. U.S.A. declares war.
 (Dec.) Fall of Hongkong
- 1942 (Feb.) Fall of Singapore.
 (March) Fall of Rangoon.
 (May) Fall of Corregidor.
 (May) British occupy Madagascar.
 (June) Rommel takes Tobruk.
- (Oct.) Viceroy issued White Paper promising Ultimate Dominion Status.
- 1940 Congress Working Committee demand complete independence and establishment of provisional National Government.
- 1941 Conference of Moderate leaders under Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru submitted proposals for reconstruction of Viceroy's Council, defence and finance to be transferred to Indians. Dominion status at end of war.
 (July) Five Indians appointed to Viceroy's Council and Indian States were represented in War Advisory Council.
- 1942 Sir Stafford Cripps goes to India with new British proposals:— Indian Union of Dominion status; elected body to frame new constitution immediately after war; Indian States to participate; provision made for Provinces not willing to accede.
 (May) All-India Congress Committee passes resolution rejecting any proposal which retains even a partial measure of British control and authority in India.
 (Aug.) Arrest of Congress leaders.

APPENDIX II

STATISTICS

TOTAL AREA OF INDIA

British India ..	1,096,171 square miles
Indian States ..	712,508 square miles
All India ..	1,808,679 square miles

TOTAL POPULATION OF ALL INDIA (EXCLUDING BURMA)

(Figures given in millions)

			<i>British India</i>	<i>Indian States and Agencies</i>	<i>Total</i>
Census	1901		221	63	284
"	1911		232	71	303
"	1921		250	56	306
"	1931		275	63	338
"	1941 (a)		296	93	389 (b)

(a) Provisional figures.

(b) Males 201 million, females 188 million.

POPULATION OF THE TEN PRINCIPAL CITIES

1941 (a)			1931		
<i>City</i>	<i>Population</i>		<i>City</i>	<i>Population</i>	
1. Calcutta (b) ..	2,109,000		1. Bombay ..	1,161,000	
2. Bombay ..	1,488,000		2. Calcutta (b) ..	1,141,000	
3. Madras ..	777,000		3. Madras ..	647,000	
4. Hyderabad ..	729,000		4. Hyderabad ..	467,000	
5. Lahore ..	672,000		5. Lahore ..	430,000	
6. Ahmedabad ..	590,000		6. Delhi ..	365,000	
7. Delhi ..	533,000		7. Ahmedabad ..	310,000	
8. Cawnpore ..	487,000		8. Lucknow ..	275,000	
9. Amritsar ..	391,000		9. Amritsar ..	265,000	
10. Lucknow ..	387,000		10. Karachi ..	248,000	

(a) Provisional figures.

(b) Figures for Calcutta are subject to correction.

POPULATION BY RELIGIONS (1931 CENSUS)
(FIGURES GIVEN IN MILLIONS)

	<i>Hindus</i>	<i>Moslems</i>	<i>Christians</i>	<i>Sikhs</i>	<i>Buddhists</i>	<i>Tribal and other Creeds</i>
British India	177.1	66.4	3.6	3.2	.4	16.1
Indian States	61.5	10.7	2.4	1.1	.1	5.5
Total ..	238.6	77.1	6	4.3	.5	21.6

DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION ACCORDING TO MAIN
LANGUAGES¹

(CENSUS 1931)

<i>Languages by Families</i>	<i>No. of Languages spoken</i>	<i>Population in Millions</i>
Vernaculars of India:		
Indo-European (Aryan)	30	257
Dravidian	15	72
Tibeto-Chinese	122	14
Austro-Asiatic	16	5
Others, including unclassified	20	2
Total	203	
Vernacular of other Asiatic Countries and Africa	17	0.3
European Languages	20	0.3
Grand Total	240	350.6

(1) Including Burma to which figures for Tibeto-Chinese mainly refer.

NOTE.—The above table, though on a broad classification, is sufficient to show the great variety of languages in use in India and Burma in 1931. There were then no fewer than 24 different languages each in use by over a million people; for example, Western Hindi was the language of 71½ millions, Bengali of 53½ millions, Telugu or Andhra of 26½ millions, Bihari of nearly 28 millions, Marathi of nearly 21 millions, Panjabi of nearly 16 millions, and so on. Another 31 different languages were in use by sections of the population each numbering 100,000 to 1,000,000; the remaining vernacular languages were spoken by sections of the population each numbering under 100,000.

POPULATION BY COMMUNITIES

CENSUS OF INDIA 1931 AND 1941 (*provisional*)

(The figures are given in thousands)

Province	Year	Hindus other than Scheduled Castes	Sched- uled Castes	Moslems	Indian Christians	Sikhs	Total Popu- lation
Madras	1931	34,043	7,234	3,306	1,774	0.537	46,740
	1941	34,731	8,068	3,896	2,001	0.418	49,342
Bombay and Sind ..	1931	14,871	1,750	4,457	317	21	21,931
	1941	14,700	1,855	1,920	339	8	20,850
	1941	1,038	192	3,208	13	31	4,537
Bengal	1931	14,671	6,900	27,498	180	7	50,114
	1941	17,680	7,379	33,005	111	16	60,314
United Provinces ..	1931	29,583	11,322	7,182	205	47	48,409
	1941	34,095	11,717	8,416	131	232	55,021
Punjab	1931	5,049	1,279	13,332	415	3,064	23,581
	1941	6,302	1,249	16,217	468	3,757	28,419
Central Provinces and Berar	1931	10,520	2,818	683	51	4	15,508
	1941	9,881	3,051	784	48	15	16,822
Assam	1931	3,103	1,829	2,756	203	2	8,622
	1941	3,537	676	3,442	38	3	10,205
North-West Frontier Province	1931	138	5	2,227	12	43	2,425
	1941	180	Nil	2,789	5	58	3,038
Bihar and Orissa ..	1931	25,267	5,744	4,265	342	6	37,678
	1941	22,174	4,340	4,716	25	13	36,340
	1941	5,595	1,238	146	27	0.232	8,729
British India(b) ..	1931(a)	138,093	39,064	65,020	3,759	3,221	256,860
	1941	151,173	40,108	81,590	3,505	4,174	295,827
States and Agencies ..	1931	50,335	11,132	10,657	2,207	1,115	81,311
	1941	55,227	8,892	12,660	2,795	1,526	92,973
All-India Totals(c) ..	1931(a)	188,428	50,196	77,093	5,966	4,325	338,171
	1941	206,500	49,000	94,250	6,300(d)	5,700	388,800

(a) Excluding Burma.

(b) These figures include Delhi-Coorg, Ajmer, Merwara, and British Baluchistan.

(c) The All-India totals for 1941 are approximate.

(d) Including Europeans and tribal areas the All-India total for Christians is 7½ millions.

STATISTICS OF OCCUPATION—CENSUS 1931—INDIA (INCLUDING BURMA)

<i>Principal Occupation</i>	<i>Nos. in Thousands</i>	<i>Principal Occupation</i>	<i>Nos. in Thousands</i>
Pastoral Agricultural..	102,454	Transport	2,341
Fishing and Hunting	840	(including postal, telephone and telegraph services)	
Mines, Quarries, etc. .	346	Trade	7,914
Industry	15,352	(including hotels, banks, etc.)	
Textiles	4,102	Navy, Army and Air Forces	320
Articles of Dress and Toilet	3,381	Police	522
Wood	1,632	Public Administration	995
Food Industries..	1,477	Professions and Liberal Arts	2,310
Ceramics	1,025	Domestic Service ..	10,898
Building Industry ..	619	Other productive occupations	7,780
Metals	713	Persons living mainly on income	216
Chemicals	603	Unproductive Occupations	1,628
Hides and Skins, etc.	312		
Other Industries ..	1,488	Total	153,916

NOTE.—The statistics cover actual workers including working dependents, but exclude 14,914 thousand engaged in subsidiary occupations. The total occupied population in Burma was returned as 6,663 thousand including 4,516 thousand for pasture, agriculture, hunting and fishing and 786 thousand for industry.

Source: Compiled from Census 1931 (detailed figures by occupation not available for 1941).

NUMBER OF FACTORIES IN BRITISH INDIA SUBJECT TO THE FACTORY ACT, AND AVERAGE DAILY NUMBER EMPLOYED

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total Number of Factories</i>	<i>Average Daily Number employed</i>
1894	815	349,810
1910	2,359	792,511
1914	2,936	950,973
1918	3,436	1,122,922
1930	8,148	1,528,302
1936	9,323	1,652,147
1939(a)	10,466	1,751,137

(a) Excluding Burma.

Source: *Indian Year Book*, 1939-40, and Statistics of Factories subject to the Indian Factories Act.

PRINCIPAL METALLURGICAL PRODUCTS (TONS)

	<i>Average</i> 1914-18	<i>Average</i> 1934-38	1937	1938
Total pig-iron production ..	243,353	1,494,655	1,621,260	1,539,889
Pig-iron exported	—	519,850	597,331	525,254
Pig-iron converted to steel ..	—	851,569	801,602	851,569
Steel production (finished) ..	95,986	648,702	665,309	693,064
Ferro-Manganese production	4,069	9,881	8,041	18,385
Copper, refined	—	6,512	6,830	5,330

Source: Sir Lewis Fermor, "India's Mineral Resources and the War," *Asiatic Review*, October 1940.

RAILWAY MILEAGE OPEN FOR TRAFFIC IN INDIA (EXCLUDING BURMA)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Mileage</i>
1854	70 (approx.)
1900	23,628
1939-40	41,156

PROGRESS OF COTTON MILL INDUSTRY

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of Mills</i>	<i>Number of Spindles</i>	<i>Number of Looms</i>	<i>Average Number of Hands Employed</i>
1900-01	193	5,006,936	41,180	172,883
1910-11	263	6,357,460	85,352	230,649
1920-21	257	6,870,804	123,783	332,176
1930-31	339	9,311,953	182,429	395,475
1937-38*	380	10,020,275	200,286	437,690
1938-39*	389	10,059,370	202,464	441,949

Excludes Burma.

Source: *India Year Book*, 1939-40.

DISTRIBUTION OF INDIAN TRADE (MERCHANDISE)

(PERCENTAGES)

IMPORTS

	1909-14 <i>Average</i>	1914-19 <i>Average</i>	1919-24 <i>Average</i>	1925-29 <i>Average</i>	1932- 1933	1937- 1938	1938- 1939	1939- 1940
United Kingdom	63	56	58	49	37	30	31	25
Rest of British Empire ..	7	9	7	8	8	25	28	31
U.S.A. ..	3	7	8	7	9	7	6	9
Japan ..	2	10	7	7	16	13	10	7
Java ..	6	8	7	6	3	0.2	0.3	2
Germany ..	6	1	3	6	8	9	9	4
Other countries	13	9	12	17	10	16	16	22

EXPORTS

United Kingdom	25	31	24	25	28	34	34	35
Rest of British Empire ..	16	21	17	14	18	18	20	20
U.S.A. ..	8	12	12	11	7	10	8	11
Japan ..	8	11	13	12	10	10	9	7
France ..	7	4	5	5	5	3	4	4
Germany ..	10	1	5	8	6	6	5	1
Other countries	26	20	24	25	26	19	20	22

PRINCIPAL IMPORTS OF MERCHANDISE 1937-38-39-40

Commodity	Percentage of Total Value		
	1937-38	1938-39	1939-40
Cotton and Cotton Goods	15.9	14.9	13.4
Oils	9.9	10.3	11.3
Machinery and Mill Work	9.9	12.5	8.9
Metals and Ores	7.7	7.1	6.6
Grain Pulse and Flour	7.0	9.0	13.2
Vehicles	5.1	4.4	4.2
Instruments, Apparatus, and Appliances..	3.5	3.8	3.4
Artificial Silk	2.8	1.5	2.8
Wool—Raw and Manufactured	2.4	1.9	1.3
Paper and Pasteboard	2.4	2.2	2.1
Dyeing and Tanning Substances	2.3	2.0	2.2
Chemicals	1.9	2.0	2.7
Silk—Raw and Manufactured	1.6	1.3	1.1

Source: *Indian Year Book*, 1939-40, and *Review of the Trade of India*.

PRINCIPAL EXPORTS OF INDIAN MERCHANDISE 1937-38-39-40

Commodity	Percentage of Total Value		
	1937-38	1938-39	1939-40
Jute, Raw	8.1	8.2	9.7
Jute Manufactures	16.1	16.2	23.9
Cotton, Raw and Waste	16.5	15.1	15.3
Cotton Manufactures	5.1	4.4	4.2
Tea	13.6	14.4	12.8
Seeds	7.8	9.3	5.9
Grain Pulse and Flour	5.2	4.8	2.5
Leather	4.0	3.2	3.8
Metals and Ores	3.4	3.0	3.2
Hides and Skins, Raw	2.8	2.4	2.0
Wool, Raw and Manufactured	2.1	2.4	2.0
Oil Cake	1.3	1.9	1.0
Fruit and Vegetables	1.2	1.4	1.2
Tobacco	1.1	1.7	1.2
Lac	1.0	0.8	0.9
Mica	1.0	0.7	0.9

Source: *Indian Year Book*, 1939-40, and *Indian Trade Review*.





